F.L.N. power struggles intensified as independence approached.

Evidence

What was perhaps the F.L.N.’s most serious leadership crisis of the war now boiled down to a straightforward challenge by the army hard-liners—headed by Boumedienne and backed by the absentee Ben Bella — to the political leadership of the F.L.N. Boumedienne had achieved in very few months a remarkable restructuring of the army (now 35,000 strong), which accorded him its unconditional loyalty, and, further reinforced by the flow of heavy weapons from the Communist bloc, his power and authority had reached imposing heights and continued to rise. Throughout Evian and Lugrin he had kept up a harassing fire on Krim for being “soft” on the French; which, indeed, went far to account for Krim’s bouts of unanticipated intransigence. In addition, Boumedienne and the new young chiefs he had appointed under him were showing thoughts that extended beyond the métier, about the political future of independent Algeria. They considered that it should be markedly more Socialist-orientated and authoritarian than intended by Krim and the “old-guard” F.L.N. politicians. — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 1445 (#corroborates, via linked claim)

Categorization

• XREF: connects to: The F.L.N.’s internal factionalism was compared to the French Revolution’s Terror.; Boumedienne’s army challenge split the F.L.N. leadership into doctrinaire socialist and old-guard factions.; Approaching peace intensified internal F.L.N. power struggles rather than uniting it (+8 more)

Related

• Interior-exterior rivalry among leaders threatened the F.L.N. as much as French pressure. (similarity 0.94)
• Boumedienne’s army challenge split the F.L.N. leadership into doctrinaire socialist and old-guard factions. (similarity 0.92)
• Post-independence leadership rivalries turned lethal within the F.L.N. (similarity 0.92)
• Army hard-liners under Boumedienne challenged the F.L.N. political leadership (similarity 0.89)
• Boumedienne’s 1961 resignation letter attacked the F.L.N. leadership as corrupt and anarchic. (similarity 0.88)
• Army hard-liners like Boumedienne drove the F.L.N.’s negotiators to intransigence. (similarity 0.87)
• Army chief-of-staff post shifted real F.L.N. power to Boumedienne’s hardliners (similarity 0.86)
• The Algerian negotiating camp was deeply split between Boumedienne’s hard-liners and Krim’s politicos. (similarity 0.85)
• F.L.N. leadership regrouped in Tunis after losing Algiers to the French. (similarity 0.85)
• Post-independence rivalry among Muslim leaders exceeded wartime bitterness against France (similarity 0.85)
• The Algiers defeat exposed a fatal interior-exterior rift in F.L.N. leadership (similarity 0.84)
• Defeat in Algiers pushed the F.L.N. leadership toward internal collapse. (similarity 0.83)
• de Gaulle’s backing of moderates collapsed as hard-liners took over the F.L.N. (similarity 0.83)
• Hard-line F.L.N. leaders read the war’s trajectory as favoring continued fighting over compromise. (similarity 0.83)
• F.L.N. wartime dissents were more personal than ideological. (similarity 0.82)

Broader Connections

• Post-independence leadership rivalries turned lethal within the F.L.N. #corroborates (0.80)
• Interior-exterior rivalry among leaders threatened the F.L.N. as much as French pressure. #corroborates (0.75)
• Army hard-liners under Boumedienne challenged the F.L.N. political leadership #corroborates (0.70) — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 1445
• Internal F.L.N. recriminations after independence exceeded those between rebels and French #expands (0.60)