Post-independence leadership rivalries turned lethal within the F.L.N.

Evidence

The next hesitation of the F.L.N. leaders stemmed from an anxiety not to “desolidarise” themselves from their fellow combatants. They wanted to see Ben Bella to canvass his support; they wanted to go to Tunis to press their case there. Both propositions were refused by de Gaulle, and were indeed quite unrealistic; Ben Bella would have been unpersuadable; once in Tunis the F.L.N. would never have permitted them to return. — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 1184 (#expands, via linked claim)

What was perhaps the F.L.N.’s most serious leadership crisis of the war now boiled down to a straightforward challenge by the army hard-liners—headed by Boumedienne and backed by the absentee Ben Bella — to the political leadership of the F.L.N. Boumedienne had achieved in very few months a remarkable restructuring of the army (now 35,000 strong), which accorded him its unconditional loyalty, and, further reinforced by the flow of heavy weapons from the Communist bloc, his power and authority had reached imposing heights and continued to rise. Throughout Evian and Lugrin he had kept up a harassing fire on Krim for being “soft” on the French; which, indeed, went far to account for Krim’s bouts of unanticipated intransigence. In addition, Boumedienne and the new young chiefs he had appointed under him were showing thoughts that extended beyond the métier, about the political future of independent Algeria. They considered that it should be markedly more Socialist-orientated and authoritarian than intended by Krim and the “old-guard” F.L.N. politicians. — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 1445 (#exemplifies, via linked claim)

Greatly exacerbated by the defeat in Algiers and the forced withdrawal of the C.C.E. from the city, internal rifts had brought the F.L.N. leadership to the brink of disaster by the spring of 1957. Once again the basic issue lay in the contention between the “interior” and the “exterior”; and, once again, the figure of Ramdane Abane was at the storm centre. — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 698 (#expands, via linked claim)

Categorization

• XREF: connects to: Boumedienne’s army challenge split the F.L.N. leadership into doctrinaire socialist and old-guard factions.; Approaching peace intensified internal F.L.N. power struggles rather than uniting it; The G.P.R.A. reshuffle purged moderates and elevated Boumedienne’s faction (+13 more)

Related

• Interior-exterior rivalry among leaders threatened the F.L.N. as much as French pressure. (similarity 0.93)
• Boumedienne’s army challenge split the F.L.N. leadership into doctrinaire socialist and old-guard factions. (similarity 0.92)
• F.L.N. power struggles intensified as independence approached. (similarity 0.92)
• Army hard-liners under Boumedienne challenged the F.L.N. political leadership (similarity 0.89)
• F.L.N. leadership regrouped in Tunis after losing Algiers to the French. (similarity 0.89)
• de Gaulle’s backing of moderates collapsed as hard-liners took over the F.L.N. (similarity 0.88)
• Defeat in Algiers pushed the F.L.N. leadership toward internal collapse. (similarity 0.88)
• Boumedienne’s 1961 resignation letter attacked the F.L.N. leadership as corrupt and anarchic. (similarity 0.88)
• Army hard-liners like Boumedienne drove the F.L.N.’s negotiators to intransigence. (similarity 0.88)
• The Algerian negotiating camp was deeply split between Boumedienne’s hard-liners and Krim’s politicos. (similarity 0.87)
• The Algiers defeat exposed a fatal interior-exterior rift in F.L.N. leadership (similarity 0.87)
• F.L.N. commanders risked being killed by their own side if they defected (similarity 0.85)
• Army chief-of-staff post shifted real F.L.N. power to Boumedienne’s hardliners (similarity 0.85)
• Post-independence rivalry among Muslim leaders exceeded wartime bitterness against France (similarity 0.85)
• Hard-line F.L.N. leaders read the war’s trajectory as favoring continued fighting over compromise. (similarity 0.84)

Broader Connections

• F.L.N. commanders risked being killed by their own side if they defected #expands (0.70) — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 1184
• Army hard-liners under Boumedienne challenged the F.L.N. political leadership #exemplifies (0.65) — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 1445
• Defeat in Algiers pushed the F.L.N. leadership toward internal collapse. #expands (0.60) — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 698