F.L.N. hard-liners treated negotiations as stalling devices to gain time.

Evidence

Despite the collapse of his initiatives in October, over the next nine months Abbas visited no less than fifteen foreign capitals in pursuit of a new peace formula. Then, disillusioned, he withdrew increasingly from the scene. Abbas, it may be assumed, was quite genuine in his pursuit still of some kind of compromise peace solution; the same cannot be said of the increasingly powerful hard-liners behind the G.P.R.A. by whom negotiations were regarded primarily as a device for getting France involved in an endless procedure, which would provide the F.L.N. with time it so badly needed in 1958–9, and, by wearing down the patience of the enemy negotiators, eventually lead to peace on F.L.N. terms. — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 977

Categorization

• XREF: connects to: Army hard-liners like Boumedienne drove the F.L.N.’s negotiators to intransigence.; Rigid F.L.N. negotiating terms outlasted France’s shifting war aims — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 450; Recognition of the F.L.N. as sole negotiating partner was the core deadlock — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 1165

Related

• Rigid F.L.N. negotiating terms outlasted France’s shifting war aims (similarity 0.88)
• Army hard-liners like Boumedienne drove the F.L.N.’s negotiators to intransigence. (similarity 0.87)
• Recognition of the F.L.N. as sole negotiating partner was the core deadlock (similarity 0.86)
• Both F.L.N. and French leaders adopted intransigent rhetoric to placate their army hard-liners (similarity 0.84)
• The F.L.N. hard-liners won standing by crediting violence, not soft diplomacy, for concessions. (similarity 0.84)
• The F.L.N. forced the French to abandon every major negotiating demand in sequence. (similarity 0.84)
• Hard-line F.L.N. leaders read the war’s trajectory as favoring continued fighting over compromise. (similarity 0.83)
• The F.L.N.’s deep historical mistrust of France drove its intransigent negotiating posture. (similarity 0.83)
• The Algerian negotiating camp was deeply split between Boumedienne’s hard-liners and Krim’s politicos. (similarity 0.83)
• F.L.N. hardliners pushed tighter population control that moderates feared would ruin negotiation prospects. (similarity 0.83)
• Recognition of the F.L.N.’s negotiating status blocked every peace initiative. (similarity 0.82)
• F.L.N. hard-liners believed French weakness made continued fighting the winning strategy (similarity 0.82)
• Algerian refusal to compromise stripped away each French negotiating demand (similarity 0.81)
• Soummam’s fixed peace terms gave the F.L.N. lasting negotiating advantage. (similarity 0.81)
• Abbas signalled the F.L.N. might drop the independence precondition for talks (similarity 0.81)

Broader Connections

• Recognition of the F.L.N. as sole negotiating partner was the core deadlock #qualifies (0.50) — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 1165