Evolutionary game theory asks which strategies survive, not which outcomes are rational.

Evidence

One way to simplify the problem is to assume that participants have a very limited number of strategies at their disposal. An extreme case, explored by socio-biologists, is that where each participant has only one strategy available to him; that is, no one has any choice. In socio-biological models such as those of Maynard Smith (1982) and Axelrod (1984), a participant in a game is a strategy. … The question socio-biologists have asked is not: ‘What outcomes are viable when participants are rational calculators?’ They have asked instead: ‘What strategies have survival value?’ — Diego Gambetta, Trust - Making and Breaking Cooperative…, 1010

Categorization

• DEFINE: Distinguishes the evolutionary/socio-biological framing where a player IS a strategy from the rational-calculator framing; useful contrast for the trust chapter.
• XREF: Connects to the repeated-game Nash/Pareto equilibrium discussions of the trust literature and Maynard Smith/Axelrod models.