Enforcing one’s own promises requires a supporting legal or information structure

Evidence

What is the need for trust, or enforcement of promises? Specifically, in addition to threatening damage, need one also guarantee to withhold the damage if compliance is forthcoming; or does this depend on the configuration of “payoffs” involved? What “legal system,” communication system, or information structure is needed to make the necessary promises enforceable? — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 40

Categorization

• XREF: This is the exact analytical question the reader is mapping onto the Mafia — the promise to withhold damage if compliance comes is the Godfather-bond; Schelling asks what legal system makes such promises enforceable, which Gambetta answers with private enforcement. — connects to: Inability to make enforceable promises can shield someone from extortion — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 722; An enforceable promise requires destroying one’s own power not to comply — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 345; The right to be sued gives one power to make credible promises — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 113 (+6 more)
• QUESTION: Worth chasing: how does the ‘guarantee to withhold damage’ requirement distinguish deterrence from extortion in the Godfather’s practices? Bonasera’s compliance depends on the promise that the beating stops when Buonasera’s debt is settled.

Related

• A promise must be enforceable or releasable by the receiving party to work (similarity 0.83)
• Without legal enforcement or reputation audiences, some bargains become impossible (similarity 0.82)
• Commitments must be communicated through evidence, not just words. (similarity 0.81)
• Credible commitment requires finding a penalty against one’s own nonperformance (similarity 0.81)
• Commitment includes removing options, delegating fulfilment, and self-handicapping (similarity 0.81)
• Hostages and shared vulnerability render agreements self-enforcing (similarity 0.79)
• Promises are needed whenever an agreement leaves incentive to cheat (similarity 0.79)
• A threat must be credible and credible threats require commitment (similarity 0.79)
• An enforceable promise requires destroying one’s own power not to comply (similarity 0.78)

Broader Connections

• An enforceable promise requires destroying one’s own power not to comply #complicates (0.85) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 345
• The right to be sued gives one power to make credible promises #expands (0.85) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 113
• Institutional and legal constraints give people strong external incentives to be trustworthy #corroborates (0.85)
• Credible commitment requires finding a penalty against one’s own nonperformance #qualifies (0.80) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 317
• Hostages and shared vulnerability render agreements self-enforcing #complicates (0.80) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 313
• Commitments are often manufactured by removing one’s own control over action #qualifies (0.80) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 714