Inability to make enforceable promises can shield someone from extortion
Evidence
Inability to assume an enforceable promise, like inability to perform the activity demanded, may protect one from an extortionate threat. The mandatory secret ballot is a nuisance to the voter who would like to sell his vote, but protection to the one who would fear coercion. — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 722
Categorization
- ADDENDUM: Directly supports the reader’s ‘On Sacrifice’ and private-enforcement framing — the victim’s inability to credibly perform the demanded act blocks the extortion, paralleling how protected clients shield themselves from Mafia coercion.
- XREF: connects to: Third-party protection requires clients to be weaker than the enforcer; Protection must include defense against rival extortionists; Extortion fails when victims expect repeated bribes and refuse the first. — PAUL R. MILGRO, PAUL R. MILGRO - THE ROLE OF…, 141 (+7 more)
Related
- Protection must include defense against rival extortionists (similarity 0.91)
- Third-party protection requires clients to be weaker than the enforcer (similarity 0.87)
- Extortion succeeds only when bundled onto a legitimate negotiating agenda (similarity 0.81)
Broader Connections
- An enforceable promise requires destroying one’s own power not to comply
#expands(0.90) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 345 - Enforcing one’s own promises requires a supporting legal or information structure
#corroborates(0.82) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 40 - Extortion succeeds only when bundled onto a legitimate negotiating agenda
#complicates(0.80) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 84 - Agenda confinement and publicity neutralize extortionate threats in negotiation
#expands(0.78) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 85