Promises are needed whenever an agreement leaves incentive to cheat

Evidence

In brief, the right to be sued is the power to accept a commitment. In the commitments discussed up to this point, it was essential that one’s adversary (or “partner,” however we wish to describe him) not have the power to release one from the commitment; the commitment was, in effect, to some third party, real or fictitious. The promise is a commitment to the second party in the bargain and is required whenever the final action of one or of each is outside the other’s control. It is required whenever an agreement leaves any incentive to cheat. — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 114

Categorization

• XREF: Core mechanism behind the reader’s Gambetta-style private protection argument: the Mafioso’s promise must bind in a way legal contracts cannot. — connects to: Crisis agreements require both a stable solution pattern and verifiable, cheat-proof monitoring — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 575; A promise must be enforceable or releasable by the receiving party to work — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 309; Cooperation can occur without trust when incentives align (+2 more)

Related

• A promise must be enforceable or releasable by the receiving party to work (similarity 0.83)
• Agreements stay enforceable through the shadow of future bargains (similarity 0.82)
• Crisis agreements require both a stable solution pattern and verifiable, cheat-proof monitoring (similarity 0.81)
• Commitment includes removing options, delegating fulfilment, and self-handicapping (similarity 0.80)
• Enforcing one’s own promises requires a supporting legal or information structure (similarity 0.79)

Broader Connections

• A promise must be enforceable or releasable by the receiving party to work #expands (0.85) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 309
• Cooperation can occur without trust when incentives align #expands (0.82)
• Future gains from continued interaction function as both incentive and sanction for trust. #qualifies (0.78)
• A continuing relationship functions as a bond deterring dishonest trading #qualifies (0.75)