Promises to genuine strangers are rare and require strong enforcement devices.

Evidence

It is sometimes supposed, on the contrary, that promising is typically used to regulate relations with strangers. Baier (1986, 246) says that exchange of promises typically requires “one to rely on strangers over a period of time.” Unless my worldly experience is extraordinary, this view is prima facie false. Promises to genuine strangers are rare, not least perhaps because a stranger would not trust one’s promise (see further Good 1988). Schelling (1989) canvasses peculiar devices for securing compliance with promises in such difficult contexts as those between strangers. Establishing reliability in such contexts requires strong measures, such as subjecting oneself to risk of real, often unrelated, harm if one fails to comply with one’s promise. When we have to rely on strangers in important matters, we commonly prefer to bind them through contracts under law. — Russell Hardin, Trust and Trustworthiness, 910

Categorization

• XREF: Contradicts the common view that promises govern stranger relations; connects to Milgrom’s law merchant on why long-distance trade needed institutions, and supports the reading purpose’s claim that trust needs observability constraints — strangers can’t be trusted without contracts.