De Gaulle’s conciliatory gestures angered the army while winning no concessions from the F.L.N.

Evidence

Neither de Gaulle’s clemency measures nor his other olive sprigs of 1959 produced any more flicker of a quid pro quo from the hard core of the F.L.N. than British governments were to obtain from the I.R.A. The principal effect they had was to anger the army and arouse mistrust among the pieds noirs. … In France, Mollet continued to support de Gaulle on Algeria, while Soustelle was becoming increasingly alienated. There also seemed to be a divergence between de Gaulle and his Prime Minister, Debré; in August when the latter declared that “France would do anything—anything at all—to keep Algeria French,” de Gaulle was saying: “Peace is a necessity. This absurd war….” — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 1030

Categorization

• XREF: connects to: De Gaulle refused to repudiate the army’s force while denying dictatorial intent; The generals’ putsch forced de Gaulle toward genuine negotiation while weakening his hand; De Gaulle misjudged the F.L.N.’s political rather than military nature. — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 946 (+4 more)

Related

• The generals’ putsch forced de Gaulle toward genuine negotiation while weakening his hand (similarity 0.91)
• De Gaulle’s mystical self-assurance blinded him to the F.L.N.’s political character. (similarity 0.89)
• De Gaulle’s peace offer meant truce, not capitulation, a distinction the F.L.N. missed. (similarity 0.87)
• De Gaulle misjudged the F.L.N.’s political rather than military nature. (similarity 0.87)
• De Gaulle’s Algeria offensive aimed partly to distract the army from politics (similarity 0.86)
• The failed putsch destroyed de Gaulle’s ability to enforce peace and forced negotiations (similarity 0.86)
• Gaulle misread the F L N as a conventional insurgency open to compromise. (similarity 0.86)
• De Gaulle’s soldier’s language misread F.L.N. psychology and ensured rejection of his peace offer. (similarity 0.85)
• France’s Algerian military dominance coexisted with its political weakness at home (similarity 0.85)
• De Gaulle’s political successes could not translate into any Algerian peace progress (similarity 0.85)
• De Gaulle took power in June 1958 offering no Algerian solution. (similarity 0.85)
• De Gaulle sought army success to reconcile it to Algerian independence (similarity 0.85)
• The French army in Algeria transformed from clumsy to effective by 1956 (similarity 0.84)
• F.L.N. deliberately sabotaged its own negotiating openings to deny de Gaulle international credit (similarity 0.84)
• De Gaulle’s intransigent refusal to yield to the riots proved strategically correct (similarity 0.84)

Broader Connections

• De Gaulle misjudged the F.L.N.’s political rather than military nature. #expands (0.80) — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 946
• De Gaulle’s political successes could not translate into any Algerian peace progress #corroborates (0.80) — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 957
• De Gaulle’s personal authority rallied France against the Algerian insurrection without any new concession. #contradicts (0.70) — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 1119
• Rigid F.L.N. negotiating terms outlasted France’s shifting war aims #corroborates (0.60) — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 450
• The French army won militarily while losing the political and world battle #expands (0.60) — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 1653