French metropolitan opinion rallied behind de Gaulle against the Algiers insurgents

Evidence

Tuesday, 26 January, began on a note of at least negative good news for the government; the army had not crossed the Rubicon, no putsch had started in either Algiers or Paris; there had been no reaction by the Muslims in Algeria, or by the F.L.N. which remained curiously and attentively passive. But Debré reported back from Algiers, thoroughly shaken by what he had seen and heard, and warning that the least false step would lead to formation of a military junta in Algiers. During an emotion-charged tête-à-tête between two old soldiers, de Gaulle, who had just buried his brother, told Marshal Juin: “I am an old man. I too am going to die soon.” Then, before the Marshal could wipe the tears from his eyes, in an abrupt change of tone, de Gaulle declared: “Whatever happens, I cannot give in. I will not give in to a riot…. If I did, I should be nothing more than a marionette and within a fortnight I would have a new uprising, a new ultimatum on my shoulders.” … Yet, in fact, events were to prove that it was de Gaulle who was instinctively, and accurately, in touch with the mood of France. With the passing of each successive day of the crisis, it became evident that public opinion—from Left to Right—was setting solidly behind de Gaulle, solidly against the Algiers insurgents and their dissident allies in the army. — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 1109 (#corroborates, via linked claim)

Once again there was no thought in the despairing minds of the “ultras” of “what then?” Nothing revealed better the egoistic isolationism of their despair and the unreal world which it drove them to inhabit than Susini’s wild declaration at this time: “The irreversible process is now under way. Between the republic and Algeria, we choose Algérie française!” Characteristically, the possible reaction of fifty million metropolitan Frenchmen was simply not taken into account. — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 1092 (#corroborates, via linked claim)

Categorization

• XREF: connects to: De Gaulle’s voice, not force, was the decisive factor that broke the barricades insurrection.; De Gaulle privately favored negotiating with the Algerian rebels as early as 1957; De Gaulle’s intransigence aligned with French public opinion rather than his entourage’s despair — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 1109 (+3 more)

Related

• De Gaulle’s intransigence aligned with French public opinion rather than his entourage’s despair (similarity 0.92)
• De Gaulle’s intransigent refusal to yield to the riots proved strategically correct (similarity 0.91)
• Algerian ultras refused to reckon with metropolitan France’s reaction (similarity 0.88)
• Algiers ultras harbored deep Pétainist loyalties and distrust of de Gaulle (similarity 0.86)
• De Gaulle’s personal authority rallied France against the Algerian insurrection without any new concession. (similarity 0.86)
• De Gaulle’s voice, not force, was the decisive factor that broke the barricades insurrection. (similarity 0.86)
• De Gaulle’s speech rallied France through timing and tone, not new content (similarity 0.84)
• De Gaulle’s broadcast failed to move the Algiers insurgents. (similarity 0.83)
• De Gaulle’s conciliatory gestures angered the army while winning no concessions from the F.L.N. (similarity 0.82)
• The ultras staged the uprising to force the army against de Gaulle (similarity 0.82)
• Ultras believed they could depose de Gaulle as they had raised him (similarity 0.82)
• The barricades insurrection proved the decisive failure of the Algérie française cause. (similarity 0.81)
• Delouvrier’s withdrawal from Algiers demoralized the insurgents (similarity 0.81)
• De Gaulle took power in June 1958 offering no Algerian solution. (similarity 0.81)
• Four factors broke the Barricades insurrection, led by de Gaulle’s speech (similarity 0.81)

Broader Connections

• De Gaulle privately favored negotiating with the Algerian rebels as early as 1957 #qualifies (0.50)
• De Gaulle’s intransigence aligned with French public opinion rather than his entourage’s despair #corroborates (0.50) — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 1109
• Algerian ultras refused to reckon with metropolitan France’s reaction #corroborates (0.45) — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 1092