De Gaulle offered amnesties and an honorable truce to the Algerian rebels in 1958.

Evidence

To lend additional enticement to this revelation of a promised land, de Gaulle began to accelerate the number of rebels amnestied. On Armistice Day, a thousand would be released; on New Year’s Day 1959, another 7,000; on de Gaulle’s accession to the presidency all capital sentences would be commuted (among whom Yacef was to be a notable beneficiary); while Bastille Day 1959 would be chosen, appropriately enough, for the release of a further 5,000. Then, at his Press conference of 23 October, de Gaulle threw out his memorable soldier’s offer of a paix des braves: … I say unequivocally that, as for most of them, the men of the insurrection have fought courageously. Let the peace of the brave come, and I am sure that all hatred will fade away and disappear. What does this mean? Simply this: wherever they are organised for combat, their leaders need only enter into contact with the French command. The old warrior’s procedure, long used when one wanted to silence the guns, was to wave the white flag of truce. And I answer that, in this case, the combatants would be received and treated honourably. — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 940

Categorization

• DEFINE: Defines the ‘paix des braves’ concept as a soldier’s offer of an honorable truce, waving the white flag.
• XREF: connects to: European liberals and Muslim Algerians shared hopes for a negotiated peace before 1956.; De Gaulle took power in June 1958 offering no Algerian solution.; De Gaulle’s peace offer meant truce, not capitulation, a distinction the F.L.N. missed. (+6 more)

Related

• De Gaulle’s peace offer meant truce, not capitulation, a distinction the F.L.N. missed. (similarity 0.92)
• De Gaulle took power in June 1958 offering no Algerian solution. (similarity 0.92)
• De Gaulle privately favored negotiating with the Algerian rebels as early as 1957 (similarity 0.85)
• De Gaulle paired Muslim representation guarantees with a peace offer to the FLN (similarity 0.85)
• De Gaulle’s soldier’s language misread F.L.N. psychology and ensured rejection of his peace offer. (similarity 0.83)
• European liberals and Muslim Algerians shared hopes for a negotiated peace before 1956. (similarity 0.83)
• A surrendered A.L.N. commander publicly urged rebels to accept de Gaulle’s peace offer. (similarity 0.82)
• De Gaulle’s mystical self-assurance blinded him to the F.L.N.’s political character. (similarity 0.82)
• De Gaulle publicly promised the army France would stay in Algeria in early 1960. (similarity 0.82)
• De Gaulle’s conciliatory gestures angered the army while winning no concessions from the F.L.N. (similarity 0.82)
• By late 1958 Muslim sentiment had hardened toward independence (similarity 0.80)
• De Gaulle’s ambiguity to the army was deliberate deception for its own good. (similarity 0.80)
• De Gaulle’s ambiguity made every faction believe he would serve their agenda (similarity 0.80)
• De Gaulle’s cease-fire overture was a truce flag, not a surrender (similarity 0.79)
• De Gaulle’s pursuit of national grandeur required sacrificing Algeria. (similarity 0.79)

Broader Connections

• De Gaulle sought army success to reconcile it to Algerian independence #expands (0.40) — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 1002
• De Gaulle’s Algerian programme initially resembled previous policy #corroborates (0.35)
• De Gaulle concealed his Algerian aims to avoid capsizing public passions #complicates (0.30) — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 1155
• Interdependence forced reconciliation between France and Algeria despite violence. #corroborates (0.25) — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 1663