De Gaulle used secret back-channel diplomacy through Pompidou to signal sincerity to the F.L.N.

Evidence

In the new year of 1961, as soon as memories of the bitter December days in Algiers had begun to fade, the complex spider’s web of pre-negotiations was spinning again. The ever-ready, helpful and hopeful Bourguiba was at Rambouillet in February, and a Swiss journalist close to the G.P.R.A. brought encouraging noises from Tunis. In great secrecy de Gaulle despatched his trusted banker friend, Georges Pompidou (whom he had called upon to help draw up his first cabinet back in 1958) to the quiet and bürgerlich Swiss cuckoo-clock city of Lucerne. It was not quite Pompidou’s scene, nevertheless it provided an inconspicuous backdrop against which he could meet the jovial Algerian lawyer, Ahmed Boumendjel, who had led the unsuccessful talks at Melun the previous year. The two men got on well enough together, and the mere fact of Pompidou’s presence was accepted by the main body of the G.P.R.A. as a measure of de Gaulle’s seriousness. — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 1420

Categorization

• XREF: Boumendjel led the failed Melun talks — an earlier attempt covered previously in this book. — connects to: De Gaulle feared even exploratory talks would imply recognition of F.L.N statehood — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 1165; De Gaulle agreed at once to meet secretly with a rebel commander — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 1186; De Gaulle concealed his Algerian aims to avoid capsizing public passions — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 1155

Related

• De Gaulle agreed at once to meet secretly with a rebel commander (similarity 0.88)
• De Gaulle feared even exploratory talks would imply recognition of F.L.N statehood (similarity 0.87)
• De Gaulle’s first public offer of power was deliberately equivocal and terrifying (similarity 0.80)
• De Gaulle’s mystical self-assurance blinded him to the F.L.N.’s political character. (similarity 0.80)
• De Gaulle privately favored negotiating with the Algerian rebels as early as 1957 (similarity 0.80)
• F.L.N. deliberately sabotaged its own negotiating openings to deny de Gaulle international credit (similarity 0.79)
• De Gaulle’s conciliatory gestures angered the army while winning no concessions from the F.L.N. (similarity 0.79)
• De Gaulle misjudged the F.L.N.’s political rather than military nature. (similarity 0.79)

Broader Connections

• De Gaulle concealed his Algerian aims to avoid capsizing public passions #expands (0.70) — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 1155