Interior fighters threatened to break from the G.P.R.A. and negotiate directly with de Gaulle.

Evidence

By the end of 1958 Amirouche and his fellow commanders had their Wilayas in a grip of terror, while jointly the power they exerted in relation to the absentee G.P.R.A. was hardly less daunting. Hard on the heels of the purge in his own Wilaya, Amirouche was writing a fierce letter to the G.P.R.A. in Tunis, accusing it of bourgeois taints and of half-heartedness in its attempts to breach the Morice Line, and calling upon it to launch a “national purification” similar to his own. — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 982 (#corroborates, via linked claim)

On 14 June de Gaulle made his television broadcast, beginning somewhat patronisingly about the backwardness of his “old country”, which he said, must be made to “marry her time”. He spoke of a glowing future when “the Sahara natural gas, the reserves of which are inexhaustible, would be capable of transforming the existence of Algeria and influencing that of Europe”. Finally, he addressed himself, “in the name of France, to the leaders of the insurrection. I declare to them that we await them here in order to find with them an honourable end to the fighting that drags on”. — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 1189 (#responds-to, via linked claim)

Categorization

• XREF: connects to: Interior F.L.N. commanders sought a separate peace that bypassed the G.P.R.A.; Worn-down interior fighters threatened to accept de Gaulle’s terms without the G.P.R.A.; The G.P.R.A. liquidated the Wilaya 4 leaders who negotiated with de Gaulle. (+7 more)

Related

• Worn-down interior fighters threatened to accept de Gaulle’s terms without the G.P.R.A. (similarity 0.95)
• Interior F.L.N. commanders sought a separate peace that bypassed the G.P.R.A. (similarity 0.94)
• The F.L.N. created the G.P.R.A. to counter de Gaulle and reclaim the initiative. (similarity 0.88)
• Wilaya commanders used purges to challenge G.P.R.A. political authority (similarity 0.88)
• Interior Wilaya commanders wielded power greater than the exiled G.P.R.A. government. (similarity 0.88)
• The G.P.R.A. liquidated the Wilaya 4 leaders who negotiated with de Gaulle. (similarity 0.87)
• De Gaulle appealed directly to the G.P.R.A. despite the private deal with Si Salah (similarity 0.87)
• De Gaulle privately favored negotiating with the Algerian rebels as early as 1957 (similarity 0.83)
• The generals’ putsch forced de Gaulle toward genuine negotiation while weakening his hand (similarity 0.83)
• De Gaulle distrusted Si Salah’s renegades as turncoats against hierarchy. (similarity 0.82)
• De Gaulle’s conciliatory gestures angered the army while winning no concessions from the F.L.N. (similarity 0.82)
• De Gaulle’s public appeal to the G.P.R.A. sealed Si Salah’s fate (similarity 0.82)
• F.L.N. deliberately sabotaged its own negotiating openings to deny de Gaulle international credit (similarity 0.81)
• De Gaulle took power in June 1958 offering no Algerian solution. (similarity 0.81)
• Renouncing Si Salah forced de Gaulle to negotiate solely with the FLN (similarity 0.81)

Broader Connections

• Interior-exterior rivalry among leaders threatened the F.L.N. as much as French pressure. #corroborates (0.70)
• Interior Wilaya commanders wielded power greater than the exiled G.P.R.A. government. #corroborates (0.55) — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 982
• The generals’ putsch forced de Gaulle toward genuine negotiation while weakening his hand #complicates (0.50)
• De Gaulle appealed directly to the G.P.R.A. despite the private deal with Si Salah #responds-to (0.50) — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 1189