Constitutional interpretation and constitutional discourse are distinct practices.

Evidence

Constitutional interpretation by formal decisionmakers committed to confine their decisions to legal bases is not the same practice as constitutional discourse, which, among other things, evaluates those decisions. Constitutional argument is available to the public at large (which constitutes the largest group of constitutional deciders) only because the language and means of such argument have a resonance in the rest of our cultural life. — Philip Chase Bobbitt, Reflections Inspired by My Critics, 767

Categorization

• DEFINE: Distinguishes interpretation by formal decisionmakers from the broader practice of constitutional discourse available to the public.
• XREF: connects to: Legislative intent and statutory purpose are conceptually distinct and often conflated — Frederick Schauer, Thinking Like a Lawyer, 293; Balkin and Levinson conclude that I must either accept whatever is practiced or abandon my pose as simply a descriptive observer. These descriptions depend on several assumptions that I do not share, and especially on conflating the ideas of legitimacy and justification and ignoring the distinction between constitutional decisionmaking and constitutional discourse.; Constitutional argument and constitutional discourse are distinct activities with different boundaries. — Philip Chase Bobbitt, Reflections Inspired by My Critics, 409 (+3 more)

Related

• Constitutional argument and constitutional discourse are distinct activities with different boundaries. (similarity 0.94)
• Balkin and Levinson conclude that I must either accept whatever is practiced or abandon my pose as simply a descriptive observer. These descriptions depend on several assumptions that I do not… (similarity 0.90)
• I further believed that journalists, and citizens generally, could make use of these forms of legal argument, although they were not confined to legal argument in making constitutional decisions… (similarity 0.86)
• For me, the use of the six forms of constitutional argument is the way we decide constitutional questions in the American legal culture. The use of these six forms maintains the legitimacy of… (similarity 0.84)
• Constitutional law and jurisprudence need have only contingent historical connections. (similarity 0.84)
• Forms of constitutional argument are validated by their presence in practice, not by approval (similarity 0.83)
• and their presence in our political discourse does not require us to deny them legitimacy or to corrupt our forms of decision according to law. American constitutional law can be a profoundly… (similarity 0.82)
• A constitutional grammar lets nonjudicial actors reason legally about constitutional questions. (similarity 0.81)
• US constitutional argument forms derive from common-law modes overlaid on the state. (similarity 0.81)
• Legal and non-legal deciders draw on different but overlapping argument forms. (similarity 0.80)
• Legislative intent and statutory purpose are conceptually distinct and often conflated (similarity 0.79)
• Constitutional understanding is cultivated through practical exercises rather than passive reading (similarity 0.78)

Broader Connections

• Constitutional argument and constitutional discourse are distinct activities with different boundaries. #corroborates (0.90) — Philip Chase Bobbitt, Reflections Inspired by My Critics, 409
• As he does with Wittgenstein, Winter intends to indict me for the particularist fallacy and for practice fetishism, though in my case it is not because I am a behaviorist, but because I am a… #exemplifies (0.85)
• For me, the use of the six forms of constitutional argument is the way we decide constitutional questions in the American legal culture. The use of these six forms maintains the legitimacy of… #exemplifies (0.80)