Chronic mutual distrust in protection markets requires unambiguous commitment markers

Evidence

It is interesting that this problem, though it arises most dramatically in situations that would usually be characterized as conflict, like that between the Russians and us or between the burglar and me, is logically equivalent to the problem of two or more partners who lack confidence in each other. If each is under some temptation to abscond with the joint assets; if each has a little suspicion that the other may be contemplating the same thing; if each realizes that the other may suspect too, and may suspect himself the object of suspicion; we have a pay-off matrix identical with that of a surprise attack problem. If the heat is on some members of the mob, the rest of the mob may be tempted to rub them out to keep them from squealing, and those in danger may be tempted to squeal in self-defense. So the game structure of “preclusive self-defense” is the same as that of “partnership confidence.” — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 463 (#expands, via linked claim)

Categorization

• XREF: connects to: Protection substitutes for trust when trust is lacking in transactions; Mutual distrust in a transaction generates demand for a third-party guarantor — Diego Gambetta, The Sicilian Mafia The Business of…, 35; Boss elections function as public commitment devices building reputation (+4 more)

Related

• Conflict and partnership-distrust situations share one identical game structure (similarity 0.88)
• Common knowledge of mutual confidence makes a focal point self-sustaining (similarity 0.78)
• Mutual distrust in a transaction generates demand for a third-party guarantor (similarity 0.78)
• State unreliability cascades into mutual distrust that blocks cooperation (similarity 0.78)

Broader Connections

• State unreliability cascades into mutual distrust that blocks cooperation #expands (0.85)
• Pervasive distrust is stable because solo cooperation invites exploitation #expands (0.80)
• Conflict and partnership-distrust situations share one identical game structure #expands (0.75) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 463