Day in and day out we send people to jail, or take money away from them, or make them do things they do not want to do, under coercion of force, and we justify all of this by speaking of such…

Day in and day out we send people to jail, or take money away from them, or make them do things they do not want to do, under coercion of force, and we justify all of this by speaking of such persons as having broken the law or having failed to meet their legal obligations, or having interfered with other people’s legal rights. Even in clear cases (a bank robber or a willful breach of contract), when we are confident that someone had a legal obligation and broke it, we are not able to give a satisfactory account of what that means, or why that entitles the state to punish or coerce him. We may feel confident that what we are doing is proper, but until we can identify the principles we are following we cannot be sure that they are sufficient, or whether we are applying them consistently. In less clear cases, when the issue of whether an obligation has been broken is for some reason controversial, the pitch of these nagging questions rises, and our responsibility to find answers deepens.

Evidence

These eruptions signal a chronic disease. Day in and day out we send people to jail, or take money away from them, or make them do things they do not want to do, under coercion of force, and we justify all of this by speaking of such persons as having broken the law or having failed to meet their legal obligations, or having interfered with other people’s legal rights. Even in clear cases (a bank robber or a willful breach of contract), when we are confident that someone had a legal obligation and broke it, we are not able to give a satisfactory account of what that means, or why that entitles the state to punish or coerce him. We may feel confident that what we are doing is proper, but until we can identify the principles we are following we cannot be sure that they are sufficient, or whether we are applying them consistently. — Ronald M. Dworkin, The Model of Rules, 10 (#corroborates, via linked claim)

We make an important distinction between law and even the general orders of a gangster. We feel that the law’s strictures-and its sanctions-are different in that they are obligatory in a way that the outlaw’s commands are not. Austin’s analysis has no place for any such distinction, because it defines an obligation as subjection to the threat of force, and so founds the authority of law entirely on the sovereign’s ability and will to harm those who disobey. Perhaps the distinction we make is illusory-perhaps our feelings of some special authority attaching to the law is based on religious hangover or another sort of mass self-deception. But Austin does not demonstrate this, and we are entitled to insist that an analysis of our concept of law either acknowledge and explain our attitudes, or show why they are mistaken. — Ronald M. Dworkin, The Model of Rules, 40 (#expands, via linked claim)

Categorization

• corroborated: 13 independent passages support this claim
• XREF: connects to: These are not puzzles for the cupboard, to be taken down on rainy days for fun. They are sources of continuing embarrassment, and they nag at our attention. They embarrass us in dealing with particular problems that we must solve, one way or another. Suppose a novel right-of-privacy case comes to court, and there is no statute or precedent either granting or denying the particular right of anonymity claimed by the plaintiff. What role in the court’s decision should be played by the fact that most people in the community think that private individuals are ‘morally’ entitled to that particular privacy?; Of course the suggestion that we stop talking about ‘the law’ and ‘legal obligation’ is mostly bluff. These concepts are too deeply cemented into the structure of our political practices-they cannot be given up like cigarettes or hats. Some of the nominalists have half-admitted this and said that the myths they condemn should be thought of as Platonic myths and retained to seduce the masses into order. This is perhaps not so cynical a suggestion as it seems; perhaps it is a covert hedging of a dubious bet.; Legal obligation differs from mere coercion by threat of force — Ronald M. Dworkin, The Model of Rules, 40 (+14 more)

Related

• Legal coercion lacks a satisfactory account even in clear cases (similarity 0.91)
• Can we say that we have, in principle at least, the same reasons for meeting our legal obligations that we have for meeting our moral obligations? (similarity 0.87)
• Concepts of law and legal obligation must stay until shown illusory (similarity 0.87)
• The concepts of legal right and obligation, despite daily reliance, resist clear definition. (similarity 0.86)
• Of course the suggestion that we stop talking about ‘the law’ and ‘legal obligation’ is mostly bluff. These concepts are too deeply cemented into the structure of our political practices-they… (similarity 0.84)
• Legal nominalists treat law and obligation as myths to be discarded (similarity 0.82)
• It may be that when the details of this practice are laid bare, the concepts we do use will be shown to be as silly and as thick with illusion as those the nominalists invented. If so, then we… (similarity 0.81)
• Conceptual puzzles about ‘the law’ and ‘legal obligation’ become acute when a court is confronted with a problem like this. (similarity 0.81)
• Legal obligation differs from mere coercion by threat of force (similarity 0.80)
• Ronald M. Dworkin — The Model of Rules (similarity 0.80)
• A rule differs from an order, among other ways, by being normative, by setting a standard of behavior that has a call on its subject beyond the threat that may enforce it. A rule can never be… (similarity 0.79)

Broader Connections

• Legal coercion lacks a satisfactory account even in clear cases #corroborates (0.85) — Ronald M. Dworkin, The Model of Rules, 10
• Legal obligation differs from mere coercion by threat of force #expands (0.70) — Ronald M. Dworkin, The Model of Rules, 40
• A rule differs from an order, among other ways, by being normative, by setting a standard of behavior that has a call on its subject beyond the threat that may enforce it. A rule can never be… #expands (0.65)
• Can we say that we have, in principle at least, the same reasons for meeting our legal obligations that we have for meeting our moral obligations? #expands (0.60)
• Austin’s definition of legal obligation followed from this definition of law. One has a legal obligation, he thought, if one is among the addressees of some general order of the sovereign, and is… #expands (0.60)
• Legal indeterminacy is inherent and requires a justified role for conscience #expands (0.55) — Philip Chase Bobbitt, Reflections Inspired by My Critics, 786
• Legal nominalists treat law and obligation as myths to be discarded #complicates (0.55) — Ronald M. Dworkin, The Model of Rules, 11
• Conceptual puzzles about ‘the law’ and ‘legal obligation’ become acute when a court is confronted with a problem like this. #exemplifies (0.50)
• Concepts of law and legal obligation must stay until shown illusory #responds-to (0.50) — Ronald M. Dworkin, The Model of Rules, 17
• Justifying a legal system differs fundamentally from causally explaining it through politics or psychology #expands (0.50) — Philip Chase Bobbitt, Reflections Inspired by My Critics, 181
• Legal rules resting only on past authority deserve condemnation when their rationale has lapsed #expands (0.50) — Ruggero J. Aldisert, Agatha D. Aldisert, Logic for Lawyers- A Guide to Clear…, 1067
• Crime can be redefined as tort requiring repair rather than retribution #responds-to (0.50)
• It is true that, in my law classes, I spend a good deal of time with students practicing various kinds of argument. Every professor does this-every one must, although perhaps usually less… #expands (0.40)