Legal coercion lacks a satisfactory account even in clear cases

Evidence

These eruptions signal a chronic disease. Day in and day out we send people to jail, or take money away from them, or make them do things they do not want to do, under coercion of force, and we justify all of this by speaking of such persons as having broken the law or having failed to meet their legal obligations, or having interfered with other people’s legal rights. Even in clear cases (a bank robber or a willful breach of contract), when we are confident that someone had a legal obligation and broke it, we are not able to give a satisfactory account of what that means, or why that entitles the state to punish or coerce him. We may feel confident that what we are doing is proper, but until we can identify the principles we are following we cannot be sure that they are sufficient, or whether we are applying them consistently. — Ronald M. Dworkin, The Model of Rules, 10

Categorization

• XREF: Connects to H.L.A. Hart’s challenge to Austin’s command theory of law, which Dworkin engages throughout this work. — connects to: Day in and day out we send people to jail, or take money away from them, or make them do things they do not want to do, under coercion of force, and we justify all of this by speaking of such persons as having broken the law or having failed to meet their legal obligations, or having interfered with other people’s legal rights. Even in clear cases (a bank robber or a willful breach of contract), when we are confident that someone had a legal obligation and broke it, we are not able to give a satisfactory account of what that means, or why that entitles the state to punish or coerce him. We may feel confident that what we are doing is proper, but until we can identify the principles we are following we cannot be sure that they are sufficient, or whether we are applying them consistently. In less clear cases, when the issue of whether an obligation has been broken is for some reason controversial, the pitch of these nagging questions rises, and our responsibility to find answers deepens.; The concepts of legal right and obligation, despite daily reliance, resist clear definition. — Ronald M. Dworkin, The Model of Rules, 0; Legal obligation differs from mere coercion by threat of force — Ronald M. Dworkin, The Model of Rules, 40 (+2 more)

Broader Connections

• Legal obligation differs from mere coercion by threat of force #expands (0.60) — Ronald M. Dworkin, The Model of Rules, 40
• Narrow concepts of legal validity fail to prevent official abuse of power #complicates (0.50) — HLA Hart, The Concept of Law (Clarendon Law…, 502