Alliance commitments generate durable domestic constituencies that resist their abandonment.

Evidence

All government policies, in democratic and nondemocratic states, depend on a careful balancing of the benefits and costs seen by internal factions or constituents. National leaders interested in maintaining a strong defense position can use alliance commitments to justify higher defense spending, from which other domestic actors (defense contractors, armed services, legislators) benefit. Support from these domestic factions insures against defense cuts or changes, as does the historic reluctance of states to be seen as failing in their alliance commitments. As a result, there will always be a core of alliance supporters—how large and how consistent that core is will depend greatly on the specific commitment. — Robert B. McCalla, NATO’s persistence after the cold war, 142

Categorization

• XREF: Connects to my interest in NATO persisting after the Soviet threat vanished — this is a mechanism explaining that persistence independent of the founding enemy. — connects to: alliance persistence requires domestic political support that international relations theories overlook — Robert B. McCalla, NATO’s persistence after the cold war, 139; Alliances can persist and expand purposes after their founding enemy disappears — Robert B. McCalla, NATO’s persistence after the cold war, 60; An alliance persists when its founding enemy vanishes. — Robert B. McCalla, NATO’s persistence after the cold war, 57 (+4 more)
• SEED: Could anchor an essay on how institutions build self-sustaining internal constituencies that outlive their original purpose.

Broader Connections

• Domestic political costs constrain alliance participation once the founding threat recedes #expands (0.88) — Robert B. McCalla, NATO’s persistence after the cold war, 143
• Overseas bases create entrenched constituencies dependent on their continuation #expands (0.84) — David Vine, Base Nation_ How U.S. Military Bases…, 1058
• Alliances can persist and expand purposes after their founding enemy disappears #exemplifies (0.82) — Robert B. McCalla, NATO’s persistence after the cold war, 60
• An alliance persists when its founding enemy vanishes. #exemplifies (0.80) — Robert B. McCalla, NATO’s persistence after the cold war, 57
• Established regimes persist because compliance incentives and vested interests accrue over time #corroborates (0.78) — Robert B. McCalla, NATO’s persistence after the cold war, 114
• Political systems are structured to resist change and preserve existing relations. #corroborates (0.72) — Michael Lipsky, Street-Level Bureaucracy, 1365