Institutions persist past their founding purpose because maintaining them costs less than replacing them.
Evidence
Institutionalist theory would lead us to expect that rather than folding NATO’s tent, declaring victory, and moving to create new institutions, NATO members will take the alliance in new directions, making use of existing procedures and mechanisms to build on past successes to deal with new problems. They spent forty-five years learning how to work as a long-term coalition through a sophisticated political and military structure. NATO members can thus be expected to turn first to existing mechanisms and procedures when confronted with new problems rather than creating new non-NATO institutions. The presumption is that actors will be disinclined to abandon sunk costs (political and economic) of existing institutional arrangements, turning instead to a mechanism (NATO) that already works. Developing new institutions or consultative frameworks entails start-up costs; NATO’s appeal is that these costs already have been paid. A common refrain from NATO officials was that it is easier to change NATO’s direction than to obtain unanimous agreement on a new treaty-based organization. — Robert B. McCalla, NATO’s persistence after the cold war, 119 (
#expands, via linked claim)
Categorization
- recurring: this claim recurs 4 times within its source
- XREF: connects to: Organizations pursue survival through resistance, self-affirmation, and adaptation — Robert B. McCalla, NATO’s persistence after the cold war, 71; Existing institutions get redirected toward new problems because sunk costs make replacement costly. — Robert B. McCalla, NATO’s persistence after the cold war, 119
Related
- Mature institutions survive their founding purpose because members prefer sunk costs over new formation (similarity 0.94)
- Existing institutions get redirected toward new problems because sunk costs make replacement costly. (similarity 0.93)
- NATO’s institutionalization beyond mutual defense explains its persistence after its founding threat vanished. (similarity 0.86)
- An institutionalist view holds alliances survive only while states value their benefits. (similarity 0.85)
- NATO survived the cold war’s end due to institutionalization, not merely threats (similarity 0.85)
- Alliances can persist and expand purposes after their founding enemy disappears (similarity 0.84)
- NATO’s survival hinges on member states continuing to benefit from it (similarity 0.84)
- High institutionalization distinguishes NATO from traditional alliances. (similarity 0.83)
- Deeply institutionalized alliances outlast ad hoc ones against realist expectations (similarity 0.83)
- NATO adapts tasks to persist, as organizational resources enable institutional survival. (similarity 0.83)
- Organizations pursue survival through resistance, self-affirmation, and adaptation (similarity 0.83)
- Theoretical frameworks beyond realism are needed to explain NATO’s survival. (similarity 0.83)
- Alliance commitments generate durable domestic constituencies that resist their abandonment. (similarity 0.82)
- NATO’s dense institutionalization beyond mutual defense is what made it survive its founding threat. (similarity 0.82)
- A regime’s benefits outlast its founding purpose, so states retain it. (similarity 0.82)
Broader Connections
- Existing institutions get redirected toward new problems because sunk costs make replacement costly.
#expands(0.95) — Robert B. McCalla, NATO’s persistence after the cold war, 119