Established regimes persist because compliance incentives and vested interests accrue over time

Evidence

The fundamental idea here is that once a regime exists, there are internal and external incentives to perpetuate it rather than start anew when problems arise. As a means of solving collective action problems, a regime increases the likelihood of a state’s compliance with regime norms and expectations, even though such behavior might not be what the state would engage in absent the regime. Regimes also create internal incentives for norm compliance as domestic actors develop a stake in the regime and regime norms become part of individual belief systems on the part of officials and even the public. Finally, an institution’s success creates a momentum for the institution that is particularly useful at a time of external change or stress. — Robert B. McCalla, NATO’s persistence after the cold war, 114

Categorization

• XREF: Directly relevant to the reading purpose: explains the mechanism by which NATO could persist and consolidate after its founding enemy vanished — institutional momentum survive the purpose that created it. — connects to: A regime’s benefits outlast its founding purpose, so states retain it. — Robert B. McCalla, NATO’s persistence after the cold war, 109; Regime legacies persist independently of the conditions that created them; Authority builds from accumulated past compliance without requiring ongoing justification (+14 more)

Broader Connections

• Authority builds from accumulated past compliance without requiring ongoing justification #expands (0.90)
• Regime legacies persist independently of the conditions that created them #corroborates (0.88)
• Institutional legacies persist after the conditions that produced them vanish #corroborates (0.86) — Anna M. Grzymala-Busse, Redeeming The Communist Past, 106
• Institutional legacies persist through deliberate elite action, not inertia alone #complicates (0.82) — Anna M. Grzymala-Busse, Redeeming The Communist Past, 371
• Pacted transitions preserve predecessor regimes’ legal and economic frameworks #exemplifies (0.80) — Philip Mirowski & Dieter Plehwe (eds.), The Road from Mont Pèlerin, 1607
• Policies persist even when their original justifications change #corroborates (0.78) — John T. Jost and Jim Sidanius, Political Psychology, 2585
• Transitional pacts preserved technocratic economic continuity across regime change #exemplifies (0.78) — Philip Mirowski & Dieter Plehwe (eds.), The Road from Mont Pèlerin, 1643
• Compliance becomes rational when goods and services abound #qualifies (0.76) — Herbert Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man, 228
• Stabilized politics make direct legacy influence fade into structure #qualifies (0.75) — Anna M. Grzymala-Busse, Redeeming The Communist Past, 135
• A regime’s prior trajectory shapes its present repertoires #corroborates (0.75) — Charles Tilly, Regimes and Repertoires, 683
• Virtuous cycles of trust and confidence can be reinforced by stable institutions. #corroborates (0.74) — Diego Gambetta, Trust - Making and Breaking Cooperative…, 1442
• External institutional incentives can align interests with commitments #corroborates (0.74) — Russell Hardin, Trust and Trustworthiness, 167
• A regime consists of repeated strong relations among government and major political actors. #expands (0.73)
• Sustained commitment usually depends on external social institutions for enforcement. #complicates (0.72)
• Dominance is maintained through unstable equilibria that concede some subordinate interests #expands (0.72)