Unilateral, non-reciprocal communication can coordinate both parties’ expectations

Evidence

Whether this consideration or just the usual inhibitions on serious negotiation make prior discussion impossible, there is still a useful idea that emerges from one of our earlier games. It is that negotiation or communication for the purpose of coordinating expectations need not be reciprocal: unilateral negotiation may provide the coordination that will save both parties. Furthermore, even an unwilling member cannot necessarily make himself unavailable for the receipt of messages. — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 201

Categorization

• XREF: This is the core of Schelling’s focal-point/coordination theory — connects directly to Gambetta’s signaling and Milgrom et al. private-judge analysis where unilateral commitment signals do the work of formal reciprocity. — connects to: Simple discrete salient limits enable coordinated expectations. — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 602; Mutually perceived signals explain the pull of psychologically dominant equilibria. — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 874; The power to send but not receive gives a bargainer an unanswerable advantage — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 152 (+13 more)
• QUESTION: How does this unilateral-coordination mechanic extend to the Don’s one-sided promises of protection where the ‘other party’ never formally accepts?

Related

• Even explicit bargaining relies on tacit signals to coordinate expectations (similarity 0.84)
• The power to send but not receive gives a bargainer an unanswerable advantage (similarity 0.84)
• Bargaining outcomes rest on convergent reflexive expectations, not on force or merit (similarity 0.81)
• Rational players can correlate strategies without communicating, even with conflicting preferences (similarity 0.80)
• Rational agreement operates through shared psychic expectations, not mathematical reasoning (similarity 0.80)
• Limited-rationality partners need the solution communicated to them before they can commit (similarity 0.79)
• Pre-arranged communication infrastructure raises the odds tacit bargaining succeeds (similarity 0.79)
• Mutually perceived signals explain the pull of psychologically dominant equilibria. (similarity 0.79)
• Desperate mutual need makes even poor signals coordinate action (similarity 0.79)
• Explicit bargaining outcomes rest on prior tacit coordination between rational players (similarity 0.78)

Broader Connections

• Explicit bargaining outcomes rest on prior tacit coordination between rational players #expands (0.80) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 858
• Rational agreement operates through shared psychic expectations, not mathematical reasoning #expands (0.78) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 275
• Tacit and explicit bargaining form one continuum dependent on coordinated expectations #expands (0.75) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 186
• Mutual trust cannot develop in unequal, nonreciprocal power relations #contradicts (0.72) — Russell Hardin, Trust and Trustworthiness, 477
• Social possibility rests on well-founded expectations about others’ conduct #corroborates (0.70)