Desperate mutual need makes even poor signals coordinate action

Evidence

When some signal is desperately needed by both parties and both parties know it, even a poor signal and a discriminatory one may command recognition, in default of any other. Once the contingency is upon them, their interests, which originally diverged in the play of threats and deterrents, substantially coincide in the desperate need for a focus of agreement. — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 201

Categorization

• XREF: This ‘interests converge under contingency’ mechanic parallels how the Don’s clients, lacking state recourse, find their interests coinciding in his arbitration — Bonasera’s submission is the desperate need for a focus of agreement. — connects to: Even explicit bargaining relies on tacit signals to coordinate expectations — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 187; An unchallenged proposal coordinates action as well as an accepted one — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 201; Asymmetrical narrow-road conflicts empirically support the coordination-signal principle. — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 875 (+2 more)

Related

• An unchallenged proposal coordinates action as well as an accepted one (similarity 0.83)
• Parties cannot choose which coordination signal will govern them (similarity 0.83)
• Even explicit bargaining relies on tacit signals to coordinate expectations (similarity 0.82)
• Unilateral, non-reciprocal communication can coordinate both parties’ expectations (similarity 0.79)
• Concessions require an obvious stopping point to avoid signaling collapse (similarity 0.78)
• The bargaining solution’s appeal derives from its focal quality, not its formal derivation (similarity 0.78)
• Asymmetrical narrow-road conflicts empirically support the coordination-signal principle. (similarity 0.78)

Broader Connections

• Even explicit bargaining relies on tacit signals to coordinate expectations #corroborates (0.85) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 187
• An unchallenged proposal coordinates action as well as an accepted one #corroborates (0.80) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 201
• Asymmetrical narrow-road conflicts empirically support the coordination-signal principle. #corroborates (0.80) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 875
• Concessions require an obvious stopping point to avoid signaling collapse #qualifies (0.75) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 179
• Power operates through indirect communication, not direct action #corroborates (0.72) — Niklas Luhmann, Trust and Power, 604