Limited-rationality partners need the solution communicated to them before they can commit
Evidence
But if the bear is of limited rationality, having a capacity for making rational and consistent choices among the alternatives that he perceives but lacking the capacity to solve games—that is, lacking the capacity to determine introspectively the choices that a partner would make—the communication system must make it possible for him to receive a message from his partner. The partner must then formulate the proposition (choice) for the bear and communicate it to him, in order that the bear may then respond by accepting the promise (now that he sees what the “solution” is) and transmitting authoritative evidence back to his own partner. — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 345
Categorization
- XREF: Parallels Milgrom-North-Weingast private judges: the merchant-law judge does not rule but certifies and records — formulating the choice that parties could not solve introspectively themselves. Also maps to how Corleone must tell Bonasera exactly what deal to accept. — connects to: Commitment strategies require communication and risk provoking stalemate — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 77; Unilateral, non-reciprocal communication can coordinate both parties’ expectations — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 201
Related
- Unilateral, non-reciprocal communication can coordinate both parties’ expectations (similarity 0.79)
Broader Connections
- Commitment strategies require communication and risk provoking stalemate
#corroborates(0.85) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 77 - Unilateral, non-reciprocal communication can coordinate both parties’ expectations
#corroborates(0.80) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 201