The power to send but not receive gives a bargainer an unanswerable advantage
Evidence
Better still may be to have the power to send but not to receive messages: if one can announce his position and state that his transmitter works but not his receiver, saying that he will wait where he is until the other arrives, the latter has no choice. He can make no effective counteroffer, since no counteroffer could be heard. — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 152
Categorization
- XREF: Connects directly to the reader’s commitment-credibility framework: unilateral transmission is the strongest form of Schelling point / commitment since it makes counteroffers impossible. — connects to: Unilateral, non-reciprocal communication can coordinate both parties’ expectations — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 201; Moves carry evidential weight that cheap talk cannot convey — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 282; In bargaining, seeming weakness can convert into strategic strength. — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 130
- DEFINE: Illustrates the ‘power to send but not receive’ as a strategic commitment device that forces settlement on one’s own terms.
Related
- Unilateral, non-reciprocal communication can coordinate both parties’ expectations (similarity 0.84)
- Being unreachable during negotiation strengthens one’s bargaining position (similarity 0.82)
Broader Connections
- Unilateral, non-reciprocal communication can coordinate both parties’ expectations
#expands(0.88) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 201 - Moves carry evidential weight that cheap talk cannot convey
#expands(0.82) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 282 - In bargaining, seeming weakness can convert into strategic strength.
#contradicts(0.75) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 130