UK state intervention shaped and rivalized Muslim political representation.

Evidence

Allen and Guru (2012) note the detrimental impact of increased competition between Muslim groups and organizations, and set out how formal relations with Muslim civic society were significantly different from those undertaken with minority communities historically. Most obvious was how New Labour’s approach enabled the state to have a hand – initially, a less-than-direct one – in structuring and organizing Muslim political representation and subsequent agendas. Silvestre (2010) notes that such an approach sits in contention with those of other European states, where formal relations reflect levels of self-organization among Muslim communities; in such a context, not only do those Muslim communities drive the process but they also maintain a sense of autonomy in determining what is important to them. Only where little self-organization is apparent do governments typically intervene and impose a ‘top-down’ approach. Yet as Allen and Guru (2012) note, New Labour’s latter years in government saw it seek to create its own Muslim groups through which to engage on the matters that were important to the politicians. Criticized as smokescreens behind which politicians sought to establish institutionalized forms of Islam or ‘types’ of Muslims (Allen and Guru 2012), what emerged from this were a number of groups that had little credibility or traction with grassroots communities, including the National Muslim Women’s Advisory Group and the Young Muslim Advisory Group. — A. Hussain, N. Meer, Framing Muslim Integration, 495

Categorization

• ADDENDUM: Directly relevant to ‘Grafting & Growth’ only in the loosest metaphorical sense — but a sharper fit is the theme that state-fostered ‘representative’ structures (like the New Labour-created Muslim groups) parallel how institutions cultivate artifice; still, the strongest link is to the Islamophobia-definition debate this reader is mapping across Halliday/Runnymede/Bleich.
• XREF: Connects to Mohsin Hamid’s The Reluctant Fundamentalist and Naqvi’s Home Boy in the sense of UK/US states engineering ‘moderate’ Muslim interlocutors, though the resonance is thematic rather than a specific device. — connects to: Muslim political actors in 1990 Britain already perceived a state campaign against them. — Chris Allen, Islamophobia, 67; Counter-terrorism policy and imposed loyalty requirements shaped Muslim political engagement — Runnymede Trust (ed. Farah Elahi & Omar Khan), Islamophobia: Still a Challenge for Us…, 138; UK integration policy redefined Muslim integration as an antidote to extremism — Runnymede Trust (ed. Farah Elahi & Omar Khan), Islamophobia: Still a Challenge for Us…, 446 (+4 more)

Related

• UK counter-terror funding redirected civic support away from Islamophobia work. (similarity 0.87)
• Muslim political actors in 1990 Britain already perceived a state campaign against them. (similarity 0.86)
• Counter-terrorism policy and imposed loyalty requirements shaped Muslim political engagement (similarity 0.85)
• State engineering of Muslim representation differs from its handling of other minorities. (similarity 0.85)
• UK ministers used coercive funding measures against Muslim organizations (similarity 0.85)
• Counter-terrorism policy forced Muslim groups into complicity or exclusion. (similarity 0.84)
• Governments select Muslim interlocutors only when they accept official assumptions. (similarity 0.83)
• Government engagement with Muslim groups was conditional on accepting state security assumptions. (similarity 0.83)
• UK integration policy redefined Muslim integration as an antidote to extremism (similarity 0.81)
• Official UK integration strategy framed Muslims as a threat to national cohesion (similarity 0.80)
• Integration policy must be decoupled from counter-terrorism aims. (similarity 0.80)
• State counter-terrorism focus has fostered and furthered Islamophobia in the UK (similarity 0.80)
• UK governments deployed the term Islamophobia only to co-opt Muslims into security policies. (similarity 0.79)
• Prevent counter-terrorism policy harms and alienates British Muslim communities. (similarity 0.78)
• British integration policy elites recycled assimilationist rhetoric against Muslims decades after it failed (similarity 0.78)

Broader Connections

• Muslim political actors in 1990 Britain already perceived a state campaign against them. #expands (0.85) — Chris Allen, Islamophobia, 67
• Counter-terrorism policy and imposed loyalty requirements shaped Muslim political engagement #expands (0.85) — Runnymede Trust (ed. Farah Elahi & Omar Khan), Islamophobia, 138
• UK integration policy redefined Muslim integration as an antidote to extremism #expands (0.80) — Runnymede Trust (ed. Farah Elahi & Omar Khan), Islamophobia, 446
• UK ministers used coercive funding measures against Muslim organizations #expands (0.80) — Chris Allen, Islamophobia, 482
• British Muslims face a double bind of suspicion either way they engage #expands (0.80) — Runnymede Trust (ed. Farah Elahi & Omar Khan), Islamophobia, 36
• Prevent counter-terrorism policy harms and alienates British Muslim communities. #expands (0.80) — A. Hussain, N. Meer, Framing Muslim Integration, 437