Counter-terrorism policy forced Muslim groups into complicity or exclusion.

Evidence

As a result Muslim groups ‘were faced with having to be complicit and agreeable or be excluded from the discussion’. The chapter goes on to discuss the impact of topdown approaches to structuring Muslim political representation. These factors have significantly impaired the capacity of Muslim groups and organizations to address Islamophobia, something that might not have been envisaged in 1997. — A. Hussain, N. Meer, Framing Muslim Integration, 145

Categorization

  • XREF: Connects to the broader literature on state co-optation of minority civil society and securitization, analogous to post-9/11 Muslim engagement dynamics in the UK and elsewhere. — connects to: Governments select Muslim interlocutors only when they accept official assumptions. — A. Hussain, N. Meer, Framing Muslim Integration, 492; Counter-terrorism policy and imposed loyalty requirements shaped Muslim political engagement — Runnymede Trust (ed. Farah Elahi & Omar Khan), Islamophobia: Still a Challenge for Us…, 138; Counterterrorism rhetoric masks an offensive campaign against Muslims. (+13 more)

Broader Connections