State engineering of Muslim representation differs from its handling of other minorities.

Evidence

Allen and Guru (2012) note the detrimental impact of increased competition between Muslim groups and organizations, and set out how formal relations with Muslim civic society were significantly different from those undertaken with minority communities historically. Most obvious was how New Labour’s approach enabled the state to have a hand – initially, a less-than-direct one – in structuring and organizing Muslim political representation and subsequent agendas. … Only where little self-organization is apparent do governments typically intervene and impose a ‘top-down’ approach. — Runnymede Trust (ed. Farah Elahi & Omar Khan), Islamophobia, 490

Categorization

• XREF: Feeds directly into the reader’s core debate over defining Islamophobia: the state’s ‘good vs bad Muslim’ demarcation parallels the ‘open vs closed views’ and racialization frames. — connects to: Perceiving Muslims as disloyal shifts the policy frame from anti-discrimination to securitization.; An ethnic minority identity invites questions while a Muslim identity invites hostile expulsion; Ethnic categories fail to capture the distinct experience of British Muslims. — A. Hussain, N. Meer, Framing Muslim Integration, 59

Related

• UK state intervention shaped and rivalized Muslim political representation. (similarity 0.85)
• Government engagement with Muslim groups was conditional on accepting state security assumptions. (similarity 0.83)
• State-imposed structures of Muslim representation impaired groups’ ability to combat Islamophobia (similarity 0.83)
• Perceiving Muslims as disloyal shifts the policy frame from anti-discrimination to securitization. (similarity 0.82)
• State demarcation of good versus bad Muslims blocked meaningful anti-Islamophobia work (similarity 0.82)
• Muslim political actors in 1990 Britain already perceived a state campaign against them. (similarity 0.82)
• Perceived disloyalty recasts Muslims as threat rather than discriminated minority (similarity 0.81)
• UK counter-terror funding redirected civic support away from Islamophobia work. (similarity 0.81)
• A good-bad Muslim demarcation barred Islamophobia from becoming a political priority. (similarity 0.81)
• Counter-terrorism policy forced Muslim groups into complicity or exclusion. (similarity 0.80)
• Counter-terrorism policy and imposed loyalty requirements shaped Muslim political engagement (similarity 0.80)
• Governments select Muslim interlocutors only when they accept official assumptions. (similarity 0.80)
• Integration policy must be decoupled from counter-terrorism aims. (similarity 0.79)
• British political leaders portray Jews as a model minority and Muslims as threatening outsiders. (similarity 0.79)
• Multiculturalism was imposed from above and atomized minorities into competing ethnic camps (similarity 0.79)

Broader Connections

• Perceiving Muslims as disloyal shifts the policy frame from anti-discrimination to securitization. #expands (0.85)
• An ethnic minority identity invites questions while a Muslim identity invites hostile expulsion #exemplifies (0.80)
• Ethnic categories fail to capture the distinct experience of British Muslims. #complicates (0.75) — A. Hussain, N. Meer, Framing Muslim Integration, 59