Trusted agents face a dense lattice of institutional surveillance.

Evidence

A few of these gatekeepers, professional associations that issue credentials and accreditations or regulatory watchdogs that register and provide clearance, also serve to monitor the performance of and punish abuse committed by candidates after they have been installed in positions of trust. These are joined by a huge complement of additional social-control organizations that audit trustee books and records, conduct surprise inspections, engage in undercover scrutiny, or encourage and follow up on complaints from consumers, clients, business associates, and in-house whistle-blowers. Such organizations also set up sting operations and other strategems to induce, participate in, or observe deviant conduct; surveil stock-market trading patterns, advertising, telephone billing records, and other indirect output of trustee activities for inferences of potential misconduct; crossmatch data bases (e.g., of welfare and payroll records); and so forth. — Shapiro, Susan P., The Social Control of Impersonal Trust, 92

Categorization

• XREF: Connects to the reader’s interest in how Porfiry’s institutional inquiry and Shapiro’s ‘guardian’ notion extend beyond entry-screening to ongoing monitoring of trust occupants. — connects to: Institutional trust guardians offer advance protection against future agent misconduct. — Shapiro, Susan P., The Social Control of Impersonal Trust, 103; Large anonymous groups need supernatural monitoring to avoid splintering

Related

• Institutional trust guardians offer advance protection against future agent misconduct. (similarity 0.87)
• The institutions that police trust are themselves trustees subject to the same agency problems. (similarity 0.85)
• Mechanisms for controlling impersonal trust themselves create new opportunities for abuse (similarity 0.83)
• Guardians of trust are themselves trustees requiring ever-higher-order oversight (similarity 0.82)
• Third-party trust guardians create new opportunities for exploitation. (similarity 0.81)
• Some fraudsters seek certification knowing corrupt inspectors will approve them. (similarity 0.81)
• Trust institutions vary dramatically in the guardianship they receive (similarity 0.80)
• Escalating trust guardianship distorts the original agency purpose (similarity 0.80)
• Guardians of trust are themselves wide open to bribery and cooptation. (similarity 0.80)
• Guardians of trust are themselves positioned to abuse the trust placed in them. (similarity 0.80)
• The same features enabling trust also enable agent abuse. (similarity 0.79)
• Even honest guardians may not actually deliver the protection principals assume. (similarity 0.79)
• Trust in impartial institutions substitutes for supernatural monitoring of strangers. (similarity 0.78)
• Outside trust inspectors must infer trustee quality from indirect evidence. (similarity 0.78)
• Principals collectivize trust oversight to gain leverage through embedded ties. (similarity 0.78)

Broader Connections

• Institutional trust guardians offer advance protection against future agent misconduct. #corroborates (0.75) — Shapiro, Susan P., The Social Control of Impersonal Trust, 103