Some fraudsters seek certification knowing corrupt inspectors will approve them.

Evidence

Still more problematic is that almost all these guardianship arrangements are ripe for corruption. Validation and inspection are inherently discretionary activities. And discretion can be compromised. The incentives provided by the targets of trust enforcement to look the other way are often considerable, given the fact that guardians of trust often have the power to abort a profitable illicit scheme or to allow it to flourish by giving it a stamp of approval. (Indeed, some swindlers intentionally try to get inspected, licensed, or certified-they hope, by incompetent or corrupt guardians-since a passing grade confers significant market appeal.) — Shapiro, Susan P., The Social Control of Impersonal Trust, 116

Categorization

• SEED: Angle for an essay: the counterintuitive strategy where swindlers actively chase inspection precisely because a passing grade markets the scam — corruption as marketing infrastructure.
• CANDY: A fun, tweetable irony: some fraudsters deliberately pursue licensing/certification hoping for a corrupt guardian, because the stamp itself sells the scheme.
• XREF: connects to: Guardians of trust are themselves wide open to bribery and cooptation. — Shapiro, Susan P., The Social Control of Impersonal Trust, 116; Outside trust inspectors must infer trustee quality from indirect evidence. — Shapiro, Susan P., The Social Control of Impersonal Trust, 98; Fraudsters exploit trust in overseers by forging faux regulators — Shapiro, Susan P., The Social Control of Impersonal Trust, 125 (+4 more)

Related

• Guardians of trust are themselves wide open to bribery and cooptation. (similarity 0.87)
• Fraudsters exploit trust in overseers by forging faux regulators (similarity 0.85)
• Outside trust inspectors must infer trustee quality from indirect evidence. (similarity 0.82)
• Third-party trust guardians create new opportunities for exploitation. (similarity 0.81)
• Trusted agents face a dense lattice of institutional surveillance. (similarity 0.81)
• Mechanisms for controlling impersonal trust themselves create new opportunities for abuse (similarity 0.80)
• Trust survives widespread fraud in advanced economies (similarity 0.78)
• Even honest guardians may not actually deliver the protection principals assume. (similarity 0.78)

Broader Connections

• Fraudsters exploit trust in overseers by forging faux regulators #expands (0.85) — Shapiro, Susan P., The Social Control of Impersonal Trust, 125
• A cheater’s success is parasitic on surrounding trustworthy institutions #corroborates (0.80)
• A cheater’s success depends on parasitizing a trustworthy system #corroborates (0.80)
• Institutional and legal constraints give people strong external incentives to be trustworthy #complicates (0.75)
• Inspection schemes can gather too much information and increase vulnerability #complicates (0.72) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 558