Universal trust can be rational in sufficiently benign worlds despite Luhmann

Evidence

Luhmann (1980, 72) says that neither trust nor distrust is feasible as a universal attitude. This follows as an analytical claim for distrust. For trust, however, the claim is empirical and wrong. Trust as a universal attitude could pay off for someone in a benign world in which the level of trustworthiness is quite high. There have surely been such worlds, although Luhmann’s claim is likely to be true for most people in modern industrial states. Even in only modestly supportive worlds, however, adopting a policy of taking modest risks beyond one’s level of trust can be beneficial. That policy opens up the possibility of discovering the trustworthy. It is risky, but the gains can far outweigh the losses. — Russell Hardin, Trust and Trustworthiness, 567

Categorization

• XREF: Connects to Luhmann’s familiarity/trust baseline that the reader is integrating with Saramago; Hardin directly challenges Luhmann here, which is the analytical core of the book’s purpose.
• DEFINE: Distinguishes analytical claims (distrust cannot be universal) from empirical claims (trust can be), a useful epistemic framework.