Failed trust is answered with still more trust, not less.

Evidence

It is argued by some that trust is similarly a resource—indeed, that it is a matter of “social capital.” However, as I argue in chapter 3, trust is not a kind of resource and is therefore not a candidate for social capital. Rather, if there is social capital involved in trust, it is the capital of rich relationships that ground trustworthiness and enable trust and therefore cooperation. Trust is not, as altruism may be, a motivation that we must use sparingly because we have limited amounts of it. It is a cognitive judgment that depends on perceived facts. It may or may not be in short supply, but using it—that is to say, acting on it—does not reduce the supply. In some contexts people can trust one another across broad ranges of issues. Indeed, establishing trust in one area might lead to expanding it to other areas by generating diversified or higher levels of trustworthiness. Hence trust can build on trust. — Russell Hardin, Trust and Trustworthiness, 516 (#expands, via linked claim)

Categorization

• XREF: connects to: Erring toward optimistic trust is easier to correct than erring toward pessimism. — Russell Hardin, Trust and Trustworthiness, 529; Using trust does not deplete it, so trust can build on trust — Russell Hardin, Trust and Trustworthiness, 516; Extending trust can create the trustworthy behavior it presumes (+1 more)

Related

• Using trust does not deplete it, so trust can build on trust (similarity 0.93)
• Trust is not a resource depleted by use (similarity 0.86)
• Trust behaves like moral capital that grows with use, unlike physical capital. (similarity 0.85)
• Trust reduces to knowledge while trustworthiness is motivational (similarity 0.85)
• Optimism about others’ trustworthiness is self-reinforcing through gained experience (similarity 0.84)
• Trust is a degree of expected probability, not a separate decision layered onto risk. (similarity 0.84)
• People trust less as the stakes of the entrusted matter rise (similarity 0.84)
• Trust is wrongly conflated with promise-keeping and entrusting (similarity 0.84)
• Trust can be extended to create an obligation in the trusted (similarity 0.83)
• Trust grounded in false knowledge cannot be an intrinsic good (similarity 0.83)
• Moralizing trust often stems from confusing it with trustworthiness (similarity 0.83)
• Trust is encapsulated interest achievable through many incentive mechanisms (similarity 0.83)
• Misplaced trust costs far more than forgone trust, making distrust come more quickly (similarity 0.83)
• Trust is a kind of knowledge grounded in trustworthy evidence (similarity 0.83)
• Trust, though biologically inherited in its optimism, stays subject to correction by experience. (similarity 0.83)

Broader Connections

• Extending trust can create the trustworthy behavior it presumes #corroborates (0.85)
• Potential to sanction breaches is the strongest basis for trusting another. #contradicts (0.85)
• Erring toward optimistic trust is easier to correct than erring toward pessimism. #corroborates (0.80) — Russell Hardin, Trust and Trustworthiness, 529
• Using trust does not deplete it, so trust can build on trust #expands (0.80) — Russell Hardin, Trust and Trustworthiness, 516