The perceived cost of reparations functions as a rhetorical deterrent to feeling guilt

Evidence

Political discourse regarding contemporary intergroup relations often contains implicit or explicit deterrents to collective guilt (e.g. ‘We can’t turn back the clock’, ‘If we apologize, they’ll want fi nancial reparations’; see Augoustinos & LeCouteur, 2004). Reparations might be appraised as more diffi cult for a number of reasons, including a long period of time passing since the harm was done, or because the magnitude of harm is so great that justice requires reparations of a similar magnitude. — Michael T. Schmitt, Daniel A. Miller, Nyla R. Branscombe, and Jack W. Brehm, The Difficulty of Making Reparations…, 79

Categorization

  • ADDENDUM: The ‘if we apologize they’ll want financial reparations’ discourse is direct supporting material for the institutional-apology-asymmetry synthesis, showing how reparations-cost framing operates as an in-group guilt deterrent.
  • SHARE: The noted paradox that enormous historical harm can actually excuse inaction — because proportionate reparations feel impossible — is a sharp point worth sending to someone working on transitional justice.
  • XREF: connects to: Whites feeling collective guilt may attempt actual compensation or partial reparation to restore equity — Nyla R. Branscombe and Bertjan Doosje (eds.), Collective Guilt: International…, 470; Collective guilt intensity is set by motivation deterred by reparation cost. — Nyla R. Branscombe and Bertjan Doosje (eds.), Collective Guilt: International…, 576; Guilt is maximized when reparation costs are moderate or uncertain. — Nyla R. Branscombe and Bertjan Doosje (eds.), Collective Guilt: International…, 580 (+8 more)

Broader Connections