Collective guilt follows an inverted-U curve peaking when reparations require moderate effort.

Evidence

Because we assumed that the object of collective guilt is to urge members of dominant groups to create a more just relationship with the outgroup, we expected the difficulty of establishing such a relationship to act as deterrent to collective guilt. When the diffi- culty of making reparations was low, we expected that guilt would also be lower compared to the control condition, because little motivation would be required to complete the inequality-reducing behavior. When difficulty increased to a moderate level, we predicted that guilt would also increase compared to the low difficulty condition, because more effort would be required to carry out reparations. As difficulty increased further in the high difficulty condition, we assumed that the difficulty of making reparations would outweigh the importance of making reparations. We, therefore, predicted that collective guilt would be lower in this condition compared to the moderate difficulty condition because no reparatory behavior would be anticipated. — Nyla R. Branscombe and Bertjan Doosje (eds.), Collective Guilt, 574

Categorization

• QUESTION: Does this curvilinear prediction appear to challenge simpler accounts in which any salient illegitimacy alone drives guilt? Worth checking whether this curvilinear result replicated.
• XREF: connects to: Collective guilt peaks at moderate rather than low or high reparation difficulty — Michael T. Schmitt, Daniel A. Miller, Nyla R. Branscombe, and Jack W. Brehm, The Difficulty of Making Reparations…, 4; Collective guilt intensity is set by motivation deterred by reparation cost. — Nyla R. Branscombe and Bertjan Doosje (eds.), Collective Guilt: International…, 576; Reparation difficulty has an inverted-U effect on collective guilt — Torsten Masson and Markus Barth, The identification-guilt paradox…, 70 (+5 more)

Broader Connections

• Collective guilt peaks at moderate rather than low or high reparation difficulty #corroborates (0.98) — Michael T. Schmitt, Daniel A. Miller, Nyla R. Branscombe, and Jack W. Brehm, The Difficulty of Making Reparations…, 4
• Reparation difficulty has an inverted-U effect on collective guilt #corroborates (0.97) — Torsten Masson and Markus Barth, The identification-guilt paradox…, 70
• Guilt is maximized when reparation costs are moderate or uncertain. #corroborates (0.88) — Nyla R. Branscombe and Bertjan Doosje (eds.), Collective Guilt, 580
• Guilt works as motivation whose intensity tracks the cost of required action. #expands (0.86) — Michael T. Schmitt, Daniel A. Miller, Nyla R. Branscombe, and Jack W. Brehm, The Difficulty of Making Reparations…, 61
• Collective guilt intensity is set by motivation deterred by reparation cost. #expands (0.85) — Nyla R. Branscombe and Bertjan Doosje (eds.), Collective Guilt, 576
• Men feel most collective guilt when reparations are moderately difficult. #exemplifies (0.85) — Nyla R. Branscombe and Bertjan Doosje (eds.), Collective Guilt, 575
• High identifiers experience more collective guilt when reparation importance outweighs perceived costs. #qualifies (0.85) — Nyla R. Branscombe and Bertjan Doosje (eds.), Collective Guilt, 587
• Social-identity and privilege threats also deter collective guilt beyond reparation costs. #qualifies (0.82) — Michael T. Schmitt, Daniel A. Miller, Nyla R. Branscombe, and Jack W. Brehm, The Difficulty of Making Reparations…, 73