Collective guilt can be functional by motivating reparative action
Evidence
We see collective guilt, but not shame, as provoking a desire to correct the ingroup’s past unjust actions. Indeed, attempting to make reparations for the wrongdoing of one’s group may be an important means of achieving a revitalized moral social identity. In that sense, a little collective guilt may be rather functional. As Martin Luther King Jr. suggested, “remorse can raise the moral threshold of a society.” We believe it may do so primarily by promoting corrections for the wrongs of unjust intergroup relationships. — Nyla R. Branscombe and Bertjan Doosje (eds.), Collective Guilt, 229
Thus, collective guilt arises when people accept the notion of group accountability and they see the ingroup as responsible for perpetrating injustice against another group. In turn, collective guilt functions to urge reparations—meaning the creation or restoration of a just relationship with the harmed outgroup (Schmitt, Branscombe, & Brehm, 2004). Reparations can include behaviors aimed at making up for past injustices committed by the ingroup, and behaviors aimed at creating a new intergroup relationship that eliminates current injustices. Research on guilt resulting from the ingroup’s actions suggests that collective guilt does have these motivational characteristics. Dutch students who experienced guilt about their country’s exploitation of Indonesia were more likely than those who did not feel guilty to support fi nancial compensation to the Indonesian government (Doosje, Branscombe, Spears, & Manstead, 1998). — Michael T. Schmitt, Daniel A. Miller, Nyla R. Branscombe, and Jack W. Brehm, The Difficulty of Making Reparations…, 18
Categorization
- SEED: Sketches an essay on when guilt is socially productive versus paralyzing, complicating the common framing of collective guilt as purely pathological.
- ADDENDUM: Evidence that guilt increases monetary reparations support, relevant to stress-testing the institutional-apology-asymmetry synthesis.
- corroborated: 2 independent passages support this claim — Nyla R. Branscombe and Bertjan Doosje (eds.), Collective Guilt: International…, 229; Michael T. Schmitt, Daniel A. Miller, Nyla R. Branscombe, and Jack W. Brehm, The Difficulty of Making Reparations…, 18
- XREF: connects to: Sympathy and moral outrage mobilize reparative action better than guilt does — Nyla R. Branscombe and Bertjan Doosje (eds.), Collective Guilt: International…, 1752; Equity theory organizes how perceived inequity becomes collective guilt and reparative action. — Nyla R. Branscombe and Bertjan Doosje (eds.), Collective Guilt: International…, 427; Guilt works as motivation whose intensity tracks the cost of required action. — Michael T. Schmitt, Daniel A. Miller, Nyla R. Branscombe, and Jack W. Brehm, The Difficulty of Making Reparations…, 61 (+16 more)
Broader Connections
- Equity theory organizes how perceived inequity becomes collective guilt and reparative action.
#expands(0.78) — Nyla R. Branscombe and Bertjan Doosje (eds.), Collective Guilt, 427