Reparation difficulty has an inverted-U effect on collective guilt

Evidence

Previous research on the relationship between the difficulty to make reparations for an ingroup’s wrongdoing (manipulated by the number of signatures requested to support reparations) and the experience of collective guilt (indirectly) supports such a reasoning (Schmitt, Miller, Branscombe, & Brehm, 2008). Results indicated that respondents in the medium difficulty condition (50 signatures) experienced more collective guilt than respondents in the low difficulty condition (5 signatures) and high difficulty condition (100 signatures) respectively (i.e. guilt was a non-monotonic function of difficulty; Schmitt et al., 2008). — Torsten Masson and Markus Barth, The identification-guilt paradox…, 70

In conclusion, the current research illustrates the empirical and theoretical benefi ts of considering the implications of collective guilt’s motivational properties. We have demonstrated that the diffi culty of making reparations acts as a deterrent to the experience of collective guilt, and affects the intensity of collective guilt in a non-monotonic fashion as predicted by the theory of emotional intensity (Brehm, 1999). — Michael T. Schmitt, Daniel A. Miller, Nyla R. Branscombe, and Jack W. Brehm, The Difficulty of Making Reparations…, 83

We then told them that we would give them an opportunity to reduce gender inequality by collecting signatures on a petition. To manipulate the diffi culty of making reparations, we told participants that they would need to collect 5, 50, or 100 signatures (a control condition did not mention the petition). After participants learned about the petition, we measured collective guilt. … We predicted that the intensity of collective guilt felt by men would be infl uenced by the diffi culty of reparations as postulated by the theory of emotional intensity (Brehm, 1999). More specifi cally, we expected that when the diffi culty of making reparations is low (5 signatures), guilt should also be low as compared to the control condition because little motivation should be required to complete the inequality-reducing behavior. However, when diffi culty increases to a moderate level (50 signatures), we predicted that guilt should also increase compared to the low diffi culty condition, because more effort would be required to carry out reparations. As diffi culty further increases (100 signatures), we predicted that the intensity of guilt should decrease as compared to the moderate condition, because the diffi culty of making reparations in this condition would outweigh the importance of doing so. — Michael T. Schmitt, Daniel A. Miller, Nyla R. Branscombe, and Jack W. Brehm, The Difficulty of Making Reparations…, 40

Categorization

• XREF: A parallel inverted-U shaped by difficulty rather than by identity strength: a second curve whose inflection might map onto my threat-threshold question. — connects to: Group self-investment relates to collective guilt in an inverted-U curve. — Torsten Masson and Markus Barth, The identification-guilt paradox…, 52; Equity theory organizes how perceived inequity becomes collective guilt and reparative action. — Nyla R. Branscombe and Bertjan Doosje (eds.), Collective Guilt: International…, 427; Men feel most collective guilt when reparations are moderately difficult. — Nyla R. Branscombe and Bertjan Doosje (eds.), Collective Guilt: International…, 575 (+5 more)
• QUESTION: Also an experimental design, not just self-report — the difficulty-as-curve has more teeth than the identification-as-curve for establishing causality.
• corroborated: 3 independent passages support this claim — Torsten Masson and Markus Barth, The identification-guilt paradox…, 70; Michael T. Schmitt, Daniel A. Miller, Nyla R. Branscombe, and Jack W. Brehm, The Difficulty of Making Reparations…, 83; Michael T. Schmitt, Daniel A. Miller, Nyla R. Branscombe, and Jack W. Brehm, The Difficulty of Making Reparations…, 40

Related

• Collective guilt peaks at moderate rather than low or high reparation difficulty (similarity 0.90)
• Men feel most collective guilt when reparations are moderately difficult. (similarity 0.89)
• Guilt works as motivation whose intensity tracks the cost of required action. (similarity 0.86)
• Reparation difficulty was experimentally manipulated without eliciting actual commitment. (similarity 0.85)
• Michael T. Schmitt, Daniel A. Miller, Nyla R. Branscombe, and Jack W. Brehm — The Difficulty of Making Reparations Affects the Intensity of Collective Guilt (similarity 0.84)
• The reparation-difficulty effect is specific to guilt, not other emotions. (similarity 0.83)
• Group self-investment relates to collective guilt in an inverted-U curve. (similarity 0.82)
• Collective guilt can be functional by motivating reparative action (similarity 0.81)
• Contradictory ideologies that assert change is either trivial or impossible both suppress collective guilt (similarity 0.81)
• Self-reported guilt is underestimated because guilt implicates one’s own ingroup. (similarity 0.81)
• Identification relates to collective guilt along a nonlinear inverted-U curve. (similarity 0.80)
• Equity theory organizes how perceived inequity becomes collective guilt and reparative action. (similarity 0.80)
• The ingroup’s own suffering suppresses guilt even when it sees itself as responsible (similarity 0.80)
• Categorizing at a broader level diffuses responsibility and lowers collective guilt (similarity 0.78)

Broader Connections

• Perceiving a group’s wrongdoing as situationally justifiable blocks collective guilt #qualifies (0.80) — Nyla R. Branscombe and Bertjan Doosje (eds.), Collective Guilt, 297