Sanctions designed for worst-case agents alienate the majority who comply voluntarily

Evidence

One strategy in institutional design is to start from the need to cope with the worst agents around—the so-called knaves—and to introduce sanctions that will serve even to control such antisocial types. … This deviant-centred strategy is subject to well-known difficulties, however, all of which derive from the fact that most people are not knaves—most are naturally responsive to legitimate demands—and that a pattern of sanctioning designed for knaves is liable to alienate such agents and reduce their degree of compliance. — Philip Pettit, Republicanism, 1279

Categorization

• XREF: Connects to game-theoretic work on sanctioning crowding out intrinsic motivation (Frey) and to institutional design literature on trust-based vs. control-based governance. — connects to: Blanket exclusion sanctions clash with communal settlement values and practical needs. — Jessica Carrick-Hagenbarth, Institutional Bricolage and Commoning…, 123; Sanctions targeting civilian populations are morally distinct from regime-targeted measures — Moustafa Bayoumi, How Does It Feel to Be a Problem? Being…, 1206; Majority decision-making involves coercion that must be minimized to protect freedom — Philip Mirowski & Dieter Plehwe (eds.), The Road from Mont Pèlerin: The Making…, 1183 (+7 more)

Broader Connections

• State coercion works only because most citizens comply voluntarily #corroborates (0.85)
• Sanctions targeting civilian populations are morally distinct from regime-targeted measures #expands (0.75) — Moustafa Bayoumi, How Does It Feel to Be a Problem? Being…, 1206
• Sanctions targeting deviants can backfire by worsening the conduct of natural compliers. #corroborates (0.75) — Philip Pettit, Republicanism, 978
• Universalistic norms lose force without status-group exclusionary sanctions behind them. #complicates (0.75) — Russell Hardin, Trust and Trustworthiness, 271
• Majority decision-making involves coercion that must be minimized to protect freedom #exemplifies (0.72) — Philip Mirowski & Dieter Plehwe (eds.), The Road from Mont Pèlerin, 1183
• Lenient sanctions of powerful wrongdoers draw outcry as whitewash #complicates (0.72)
• Sanctions either alter egoistic utilities or provide assurance to cooperative agents. #expands (0.72)
• Norms work mainly through external sanctions, not internalized motivation #contradicts (0.70) — Russell Hardin, Trust and Trustworthiness, 168
• Sanctions make trustworthiness a matter of self-interest rather than personal concern #expands (0.70)