Institutions can mimic encapsulated-interest incentives to substitute for ongoing relationships.

Evidence

Still, trust can be grounded in the belief that another person is guided by norms or moral dispositions. Whether we know that these, and not encapsulated interest, are the grounds for seemingly trustworthy behavior will commonly be important for explaining behavior and understanding social practices and institutions. We can build institutional devices that mimic the incentives of the encapsulated-interest account, so that we can relatively easily see how to overcome problems of the lack of trust and trustworthiness in many contexts in which, for example, ongoing relationships cannot motivate cooperation. — Russell Hardin, Trust and Trustworthiness, 279

Categorization

Category: Definitional Content

• XREF: Contract law as a monitoring substitute connects to Hardin’s observable-constraints thesis and the blindness thought experiment where such institutions also collapse.

Related

• Institutions substitute for the need to trust in risky interactions (similarity 0.87)
• Institutions designed on incentive grounds can support encapsulated-interest trust (similarity 0.87)
• Trust is encapsulated interest achievable through many incentive mechanisms (similarity 0.86)
• Cooperative interaction sustains trustworthiness through ongoing institutions (similarity 0.83)
• Institutions substitute for trust by securing trustworthiness coercively. (similarity 0.82)
• Institutions exist to block the destructive tail risks of interacting with the untrustworthy (similarity 0.82)
• Institutions exist largely to obviate the need for risky trust. (similarity 0.82)
• Trust requires knowing the other’s incentives to honor it (similarity 0.81)
• Trust rests on the trusted’s incentive to preserve the ongoing relationship. (similarity 0.81)
• Institutional constraints can make trustworthy behavior arise from aligned interests rather than care (similarity 0.81)
• Interest-based trust resists generalization from individuals to institutions and groups (similarity 0.80)
• Trust rests on the trusted person’s commitments and incentives, not just expected behavior. (similarity 0.80)
• Thick-relationship trust is a special case of encapsulated interest (similarity 0.80)
• Social conventions and organizational incentives can make people trustworthy (similarity 0.80)
• Trustworthiness is grounded in the trusted’s interest in maintaining a relationship (similarity 0.80)

Broader Connections

• Institutions substitute for trust by securing trustworthiness coercively. #expands (0.85) — Russell Hardin, Trust and Trustworthiness, 787
• Institutions substitute for the need to trust in risky interactions #corroborates (0.85) — Russell Hardin, Trust and Trustworthiness, 508
• Trust is encapsulated interest achievable through many incentive mechanisms #expands (0.80) — Russell Hardin, Trust and Trustworthiness, 151
• Organizational reward structures tie agents’ interests to the organization, not clients #expands (0.80) — Russell Hardin, Trust and Trustworthiness, 767
• Mere incentive compatibility is insufficient for trust as encapsulated interest #complicates (0.75) — Russell Hardin, Trust and Trustworthiness, 71