The legal form of subjective rights fits private liberties but not political obligations

Evidence

This self-stabilizing cycle, however, has a fault line which shows that different demands are involved in the use citizens should make of their political participation rights and in the use they can make of their private freedoms. The guarantees of both public and private liberty assume the same form, namely, that of subjective rights; but while the legal form of an entitlement is tailored to the interest-driven use of the private liberties, it does not fit in the same way with the political obligation to exercise democratic rights. Each citizen is enjoined to make use of her right to vote, and in general her rights of communication and participation, to resolve in a fair and informed manner the problem that the political parties cannot take out of the citizens’ hands – namely, that of striking a fair balance between legitimate private interests and public interests in making their political choices. — Jürgen Habermas, A New Structural Transformation of the…, 87

Categorization

  • DEFINE: Identifies the ā€˜fault line’: the subjective-rights legal form is tailored to interest-driven private use but ill-suited to the obligation to exercise democratic participation.
  • XREF: connects to: Legal right is distinct from the underlying appropriative tie between person and thing. — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: An Essay on…, 1365; Private liberties avoid heteronomy only when citizens act as democratic co-legislators — Jürgen Habermas, A New Structural Transformation of the…, 86; Rights and obligations can bind genuinely without being absolute. — Frederick Schauer, Thinking Like a Lawyer, 139 (+3 more)

Broader Connections