Recognition of the F.L.N.’s negotiating status blocked every peace initiative.

Evidence

For de Gaulle the governing factor at this stage was to avoid any move that could in any way be interpreted as recognising the F.L.N. as the one competent negotiating partner, while for the G.P.R.A. recognition was their abiding objective. — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 1165 (#corroborates, via linked claim)

But de Gaulle had refused, saying: “I don’t want it; because the day after you’ve seen them they will say that I have recognised the F.L.N. government.” Pinay: “Let me make a proposition, then: if it works, you can take the responsibility; if it fails, you can say it’s just that imbecile Pinay acting on his own initiative!” — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 1165 (#corroborates, via linked claim)

The abrupt calling-off of the terrorist campaign in France also had, in all probability, a subsidiary effect of encouraging de Gaulle to make his paix des braves a few weeks later. — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 973 (#contradicts, via linked claim)

Categorization

  • XREF: connects to: Recognition of the F.L.N. as sole negotiating partner was the core deadlock — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 1165; The F.L.N. refused any ceasefire before a full political settlement. — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 1419; De Gaulle feared even exploratory talks would imply recognition of F.L.N statehood — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 1165 (+8 more)

Broader Connections