Prejudice theory that equates bias with antipathy cannot explain benevolent sexism.

Evidence

Allport’s (1954/1979) discussion focused on ethnic and religious prejudice, primarily racism and anti-Semitism. Antipathy toward a group as a whole (and its individual members) thus formed the core of Allport’s definition of prejudice. In contrast, he ignored (with one brief exception, pp. 33–4) a prejudice that targets about half the population, namely sexism, whose nature poses a critical challenge to defining prejudice as an antipathy. — John F. Dovidio, Peter Glick, Laurie A. Rudman, On the Nature of Prejudice, 176 (#corroborates, via linked claim)

Allport’s most fundamental blindspot concerns his definition of prejudice as “an antipathy based upon a faulty and inflexible generalization” (p. 9). Chapters by Eagly and Diekman, Jackman, and Rudman in the current volume explore how this definition has obscured important aspects of prejudice, both pragmatically and theoretically. Allport’s emphasis on antipathy directed the field toward types of prejudice that produce exclusion and violence, but it distracted the field from other types of bias involving more subtle types of control and exploitation (e.g., affectionate paternalism). — John F. Dovidio, Peter Glick, Laurie A. Rudman, On the Nature of Prejudice, 138 (#expands, via linked claim)

Perhaps a victim of his time, he overlooked, as Rudman describes it, the “ordinariness of gender prejudice.” Only two pages of his book (pp. 33– 4) were dedicated to an analysis of sexism. Several chapters in our volume (Eagly & Diekman, Jackman, and Rudman) redress this oversight, drawing attention not only to the issue of sexism, but also to the inadequacy of defining prejudice solely as an antipathy. The consequence of this challenge to conceptions of the nature of prejudice is profound, suggesting that prejudice comes in qualitatively different forms, such as an ostensibly benevolent paternalism that disadvantages groups without apparent antipathy, that Allport and, for many years, the rest of the field, simply missed. — , Rudman, Laurie A - On the Nature of…, 139 (#exemplifies, via linked claim)

Categorization

• XREF: connects to: Sexism challenges defining prejudice as antipathy — , Rudman, Laurie A - On the Nature of…, 758; Antipathy alone cannot explain how sexism operates; Prejudice defined as antipathy misses the teamwork that sustains gender inequality (+9 more)

Broader Connections

• Allport’s antipathy-based definition cannot capture sexism, which lacks pure hostility #corroborates (0.97) — John F. Dovidio, Peter Glick, Laurie A. Rudman, On the Nature of Prejudice, 176
• Sexism challenges defining prejudice as antipathy #corroborates (0.95) — , Rudman, Laurie A - On the Nature of…, 758
• Prejudice is antipathy based on inflexible generalization, not mere misperception #contradicts (0.95) — John F. Dovidio, Peter Glick, Laurie A. Rudman, On the Nature of Prejudice, 2565
• Prejudice takes benevolent paternalistic forms that disadvantage groups without antipathy #exemplifies (0.95) — , Rudman, Laurie A - On the Nature of…, 139
• Benevolent paternalism operates as a subtle mechanism of prejudice that antipathy-based accounts miss #expands (0.95)
• Prejudice is irrational antipathy rooted in ignorance, without political calculus #contradicts (0.95)
• Defining prejudice as antipathy blinds the field to paternalistic control forms #expands (0.95) — John F. Dovidio, Peter Glick, Laurie A. Rudman, On the Nature of Prejudice, 138
• Antipathy alone cannot explain how sexism operates #expands (0.92)
• Prejudice need not involve antipathy, inaccuracy, or inflexibility #corroborates (0.92)
• Prejudice toward women includes positive beliefs, not just antipathy #exemplifies (0.92) — , Rudman, Laurie A - On the Nature of…, 758