Allport exempted accurate perception from the definition of prejudice

Evidence

Allport further included inaccurate perception as one of the defining elements of both prejudice and stereotypes. Although he acknowledged that a “kernel of truth” may exist (1954/1979, p. 190), prejudice in Allport’s treatment is based on a “faulty and inflexible generalization” (p. 9). … Because this restriction was based on the anthropologist’s accurate perception that many people in the tribal village suffered from tuberculosis, he concluded that the anthropologist was not prejudiced but acted upon “rational and realistic grounds” (p. 4). — John F. Dovidio, Peter Glick, Laurie A. Rudman, On the Nature of Prejudice, 177

Categorization

• QUESTION: The anthropologist example is fascinating — it raises the question of whether rational avoidance of a TB-ridden group is morally or practically distinguishable from prejudice, a boundary worth chasing.
• SEED: Article angle: how the ‘accuracy criterion’ in Allport’s prejudice definition has quietly resurfaced in debates about statistical discrimination and algorithmic bias.