Prejudice rationalizations are ideological consistency, not pathology

Evidence

Thus, Allport overemphasized the role of personality in prejudice, seeing bigots as having weak personalities, as insecure, easily frustrated, and intolerant of ambiguity. A more politically sophisticated psychology now emphasizes individual differences in adherence to group-based ideologies as accounting for individuals’ proneness to prejudice. In an often-cited example, Allport (p. 13) provided a hypothetical conversation illustrating how the prejudiced Mr. X’s stereotypical beliefs about Jews conveniently shift in response to factual counterevidence offered by the tolerant Mr. Y, but always in ways that maintain and justify his antipathy toward Jewish people. For Allport, such slipperiness was evidence of irrational motivational and emotional needs. Contemporary perspectives on prejudice (e.g., Jackman; Jost & Hamilton) interpret such rationalizations in a different light, as well-rehearsed, internally consistent, and socially validated justifications for group inequality. — John F. Dovidio, Peter Glick, Laurie A. Rudman, On the Nature of Prejudice, 152

Categorization

• DEEPTHINKING: The inversion here is dense: what looks like irrational motivational slippage is reinterpreted as internally consistent ideology serving group inequality — a paradigm shift in how we read the same behavior.
• SEED: Article angle: “Mr. X Was Rational All Along” — how reframing the bigot from irrational neurotic to ideologue changes what interventions are even worth trying.
• corroborated: 2 independent passages support this claim — John F. Dovidio, Peter Glick, Laurie A. Rudman, On the Nature of Prejudice: Fifty Years…, 152