Opening with cooperation is rational self-interest, not mere morality

Evidence

On this account, in some societies trust must be beneficial. It would be in the interests of one’s children to teach them to be optimistic about others. Trust cannot be produced at will, although it can be willfully instilled, as in children. Moreover, acting as if one trusts can be willed repeatedly so that one may slowly develop optimistic expectations of trustworthiness. In many potentially iterated prisoner’s dilemma interactions, one should open with a cooperative move in the hope of engaging the other also to be cooperative. This is not merely a moral injunction. It is a rational claim of self-interest (see discussion of the iterated prisoner’s dilemma in chapter 1). One should open with cooperation when the expected long-run benefits of iterated cooperation outweigh the short-term risk of loss. — Russell Hardin, Trust and Trustworthiness, 544

Categorization

• XREF: Directly connects to the iterated prisoner’s dilemma logic already familiar from Milgrom’s law-merchant work and the trust-as-familiarity framework. — connects to: Coercion and interests alone compel cooperation even without shared values; Egoistic motivations alone cannot sustain cooperation without plausible self-regulating structures; Cooperation rests on coercion, interests, values, and personal bonds — Diego Gambetta, Trust - Making and Breaking Cooperative…, 2202 (+12 more)
• corroborated: 2 independent passages support this claim — Russell Hardin, Trust and Trustworthiness, 544

Broader Connections

• Initial cooperation can wreck backward induction and build rational trust #expands (0.88) — Russell Hardin, Trust and Trustworthiness, 606
• Hobbesian sanctions produce egoistic macro-motivation to cooperate #corroborates (0.85) — Diego Gambetta, Trust - Making and Breaking Cooperative…, 194
• Cooperation rests on coercion, interests, values, and personal bonds #qualifies (0.82) — Diego Gambetta, Trust - Making and Breaking Cooperative…, 2202
• Coercion and interests alone compel cooperation even without shared values #corroborates (0.80)
• Egoistic motivations alone cannot sustain cooperation without plausible self-regulating structures #qualifies (0.80)
• Moral dispositions resist contrary incentives yet people overestimate their behavioral role #qualifies (0.80) — Russell Hardin, Trust and Trustworthiness, 216
• Cooperation has no single solution; motivations combine and overdetermine action #qualifies (0.78)
• Sociability among equals is an artificial stylized game, not a return to natural self #complicates (0.75) — Georg Simmel, on individuality and social forms_…, 378