Cooperation is often rational gambling on typical trustworthiness, not chosen trust.

Evidence

In addition, we require a theory of how to act on relevant streetlevel knowledge. I presume here that this theory of decision is a simple commonsense learning theory. You may start with such limited information about me that you can only estimate the likelihood that the typical person in my position would be trustworthy with respect to what you might entrust to me. You might even have such limited information about me that you can only assess from your past experience whether cooperation has paid off in similar circumstances. Suppose it did, and now you risk cooperating with me. (This is not to say you choose to trust me. Rather, gambling on me seems to you the rational thing to do.) You either gain or lose from your cooperation, and this experience is added to your evidence on trustworthiness for future occasions. If I am somehow a new kind of person in your experience, your initial estimate may be unstable, and my behavior might tilt your assessment heavily for or against my kind in future encounters. — Russell Hardin, Trust and Trustworthiness, 536

Categorization

Category: Definitional Content

• XREF: Distinguishing ‘gambling on’ from ‘trusting’ refines Hardin’s core distinction central to the Saramago integration — the wife’s early protective acts may be rational gambles as much as trust.

Related

• Trust enables action before another party’s cooperation is assured. (similarity 0.82)
• Rational trust requires both trusted’s incentives and truster’s knowledge (similarity 0.82)
• Trust is a result rather than a precondition of cooperation (similarity 0.82)
• Cooperation requires knowing others’ motives and being believed trustworthy (similarity 0.81)
• Strategies to minimize reliance on trust have been conflated with neglecting to understand it. (similarity 0.81)
• Cooperation survives even when cheating pays hugely and system costs are steep. (similarity 0.81)
• Trust requires assurance that is at least somewhat well based (similarity 0.81)
• Trust is expectation formed before the other’s action can be monitored (similarity 0.81)
• Opening with cooperation is rational self-interest, not mere morality (similarity 0.81)
• Trust emerges as a result of cooperation rather than an element of social capital. (similarity 0.80)
• Unenforceable reliance is a gamble and hope, not trust (similarity 0.80)
• Initial cooperation can rationally break the backward induction argument. (similarity 0.80)
• Cooperation rests on coercion, interests, values, and personal bonds (similarity 0.80)
• State unreliability cascades into mutual distrust that blocks cooperation (similarity 0.79)
• Trust requires both freedom to defect and constraints that make cooperation attractive (similarity 0.79)

Broader Connections

• Cooperation can operate independently of trust #expands (0.95) — Diego Gambetta, Trust - Making and Breaking Cooperative…, 2830
• Cooperation is broader than trust and mostly grounded in institutions, not trust. #expands (0.90) — Russell Hardin, Trust and Trustworthiness, 781
• Cooperation can occur without trust when incentives align #expands (0.85) — Russell Hardin, Trust and Trustworthiness, 100
• Trust requires belief in the other’s motivations, not mere behavioral expectation #qualifies (0.85) — Russell Hardin, Trust and Trustworthiness, 101
• Trust is a result rather than a precondition of cooperation #expands (0.80) — Russell Hardin, Trust and Trustworthiness, 409
• Initial cooperation can wreck backward induction and build rational trust #expands (0.70) — Russell Hardin, Trust and Trustworthiness, 136
• Trust is a rational choice even for egoists, not a natural given #qualifies (0.70) — Diego Gambetta, Trust - Making and Breaking Cooperative…, 2814