Trust clues only reduce risk, never eliminate the leap of faith.

Evidence

The clues employed to form trust do not eliminate the risk; they simply make it less risky. They do not supply complete information about the expected behaviour of the person to be trusted. They simply serve as a springboard for the leap into a bounded and structured uncertainty. It should not be assumed, therefore, that empirical research will yield strong law-like relationships between bases for trust, treated as causes, and demonstrations of trust, treated as effects, but one may expect there to be statistical correlations, since one may assume that on average trust is more likely to be conferred when certain preconditions are met. — Niklas Luhmann, Trust and Power, 171

Categorization

  • DEEPTHINKING: The core epistemic claim — trust clues give statistical not law-like prediction, and the leap remains fundamentally unresolvable — is dense and paradigm-relevant for the whole Giddens/Luhmann comparison.
  • XREF: Explains precisely why Stevens’s trust in the institution could never have been rationally guaranteed even in principle; maps onto Giddens’s faceless commitments. — connects to: Trust is proven only through unused opportunities to betray — Niklas Luhmann, Trust and Power, 203; Trust is required only amid ignorance, which always grounds scepticism as well. — Anthony Giddens, The Consequences of Modernity, 220; Reflexive trust can absorb more uncertainty with less risk (+6 more)
  • corroborated: 2 independent passages support this claim — Niklas Luhmann, Trust and Power, 171

Broader Connections