Latent public opinion rarely diverges from expressed collective policy preferences

Evidence

The “electoral reward and punishment” version of democratic control through elections—in which voters retrospectively judge how well the results of government policy have satisfied their basic interests and values, and politicians enact policies in anticipation of judgments that they expect will later be made by what V.O. Key, Jr., called “latent” public opinion—might be thought to offer a different prediction: that policy will tend to satisfy citizens’ underlying needs and values, rather than corresponding with their current policy preferences. We cannot test this prediction because we do not have—and cannot easily imagine how to obtain—good data on individuals’ deep, underlying interests or values, as opposed to their expressed policy preferences. But the evidence that collective policy preferences are generally rather stable over time suggests that expressed collective policy preferences may not often diverge markedly from subsequently manifested “latent” preferences. They may do so only under special circumstances, such as economic recessions or disastrous wars. If so, the electoral-rewardand-punishment type of democratic theory, too, predicts that most of the time public policy will respond to the current policy preferences of the average citizen. — Martin Gilens and Benjamin I. Page, Testing Theories of American Politics, 22

Categorization

• DEFINE: Clarifies V.O. Key Jr.’s ‘latent public opinion’ concept and its divergence conditions (recessions, wars).
• XREF: connects to: Policy persistence from popularity is not entrenchment; only nonresponsiveness to preference shifts is — Daryl Levinson and Benjamin I. Sachs, Political Entrenchment and Public Law, 51; Opinion-policy congruence is two distinct relationships lumped into one measure — Mikael Persson and Anders Sundell, Blocking the Poor: Status Quo Bias in…, 21; Voter preferences respond to framing even when expected values are equal (+13 more)

Broader Connections

• U.S. policy outcomes contradict majority preferences whenever elites or organized interests disagree #contradicts (0.90)
• Policy persistence from popularity is not entrenchment; only nonresponsiveness to preference shifts is #qualifies (0.85) — Daryl Levinson and Benjamin I. Sachs, Political Entrenchment and Public Law, 51
• The identical policy pairing flips majority support when status quo moves #complicates (0.82) — John T. Jost and Jim Sidanius, Political Psychology, 2448
• People’s abstract political principles often fail to match their concrete policy preferences #complicates (0.80) — John T. Jost and Jim Sidanius, Political Psychology, 3748
• Voter preferences respond to framing even when expected values are equal #complicates (0.78)
• Most voters evaluate politics through group-interest loyalties rather than ideology #complicates (0.77) — John T. Jost and Jim Sidanius, Political Psychology, 1889
• Political expression is switched on and off by group context rather than individual belief #complicates (0.76) — Nina Eliasoph, “Close to home”, 97
• Opinion-policy congruence is two distinct relationships lumped into one measure #complicates (0.75) — Mikael Persson and Anders Sundell, Blocking the Poor, 21
• Unipolar opinion convergence dominates deliberation studies more often than bipolar divergence #corroborates (0.75) — Didier Caluwaerts et al., Deliberation and Polarization, 88
• Conformity pressure suppresses dissent and alternative evaluation in policy decisions #complicates (0.75)
• Aggregate polling models cannot reveal how individual citizens change their views #complicates (0.74) — John T. Jost and Jim Sidanius, Political Psychology, 1566
• Party-linked samples answer questionnaires with party-line views rather than personal opinion #complicates (0.74)
• People’s prior attitudes shape which label they prefer for the same issue #complicates (0.73) — John T. Jost and Jim Sidanius, Political Psychology, 2459
• Differential enthusiasm for a policy does not preclude forging a tolerable consensus #qualifies (0.72) — David Theo Goldberg, John Solomos, A Companion to Racial and Ethnic Studies, 1990
• Democratic elections legitimize only as outcomes of prior public deliberation, not preference aggregation #complicates (0.72) — Jürgen Habermas, A New Structural Transformation of the…, 94