Voter preferences respond to framing even when expected values are equal

Evidence

Perhaps the most fundamental principle of rational choice is the assumption of invariance. This assumption, which is rarely stated explicitly, requires that the preference order among prospects should not depend on how their outcomes and probabilities are described and thus that two alternative formulations of the same problem should yield the same choice. The responses to problems 7 and 8 above may be construed as a failure of invariance. In the present section, we present sharper tests of invariance in which the two versions of a given choice problem are unquestionably equivalent. Under these conditions, violations of invariance cannot be justified on normative grounds. — John T. Jost and Jim Sidanius, Political Psychology, 2461 (#responds-to, via linked claim)

Categorization

• XREF: connects to: Deliberative polling reveals the public would hold different views if it thought harder — Philip Pettit, Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and…, 767; Risky challengers win bad-time votes despite equal expected value. — John T. Jost and Jim Sidanius, Political Psychology: Key Readings, 2441; Voters value electoral fairness independently of which policies result — Daryl Levinson and Benjamin I. Sachs, Political Entrenchment and Public Law, 166 (+10 more)

Broader Connections

• Rational choice assumes preferences stay stable across equivalent framings #responds-to (0.95) — John T. Jost and Jim Sidanius, Political Psychology, 2461