Opinion-policy congruence is two distinct relationships lumped into one measure

Evidence

Previous studies (Gilens 2012; Elsässer et al. 2021; Schakel 2021) typically treat congruence as a single binary relationship. However, alignment between what the public wants and the policy they receive can come about in two different ways. Consider a proposed policy change. The change can be implemented or not. For simplicity, we can also assume that public opinion has two states: supporting or opposing the proposed change. Congruence is then achieved either when there is support for the change and it is implemented, or when there is opposition to the change and it is not implemented. There is incongruence when the public opposes the change but it is implemented anyway, or when the public supports the change but none is implemented. — Mikael Persson and Anders Sundell, Blocking the Poor, 21

We distinguish between different types of congruence and incongruence, as each may reflect distinct underlying mechanisms. For instance, policy change without public support may signal an elite-­driven political development, whereas a lack of change despite public demand may point to institutional status quo bias. Clarifying these distinctions allows for a more nuanced understanding of how political decision-­making relates to public opinion. — Mikael Persson and Anders Sundell, Blocking the Poor, 22

We therefore argue that it is important to distinguish between the different types of opinion-­policy congruence and incongruence, as they point to different underlying explanations. — Mikael Persson and Anders Sundell, Blocking the Poor, 40

Categorization

• QUESTION: If congruence splits into pro-change success and status-quo success, does pooling them hide a systematic status quo bias in responsiveness?
• DEFINE: Sets up a typology: policy change without support = elite-driven; no change despite demand = institutional status quo bias.
• XREF: Connects to the status-quo-bias literature in behavioral economics and to veto-player/institutional-gridlock theories of policy. — connects to: Latent public opinion rarely diverges from expressed collective policy preferences — Martin Gilens and Benjamin I. Page, Testing Theories of American Politics:…, 22
• SEED: Angle: ‘The math of nondecisions’ — how recoding policy outcomes into four congruence categories reveals whether the rich win by blocking or by pushing.
• corroborated: 3 independent passages support this claim — Mikael Persson and Anders Sundell, Blocking the Poor: Status Quo Bias in…, 21; Mikael Persson and Anders Sundell, Blocking the Poor: Status Quo Bias in…, 22; Mikael Persson and Anders Sundell, Blocking the Poor: Status Quo Bias in…, 40