Trust constraint-setting trades false alarms against missed betrayals.

Evidence

The paradox of trust is akin to the choice between Type I and Type II errors. Should the procedural constraints of trust be set so narrowly that desirable agency behavior is deterred or so flexibly that inappropriate behavior is tolerated? Most often, principals equivocate: they really hope that trustees do not take their instructions too literally yet simultaneously fear that they will not. — Shapiro, Susan P., The Social Control of Impersonal Trust, 143

Categorization

• DEEPTHINKING: The Type I/Type II framing of social trust is a genuinely reusable lens — the equivocation (‘hope they don’t take instructions literally yet fear they will’) captures the irreducible ambiguity at trust’s core.
• XREF: Connects to the reader’s Raskolnikov analysis: Raskolnikov exploits exactly this equivocation, betting the procedural constraints are flexibly set toward him. — connects to: Protection substitutes for trust when trust is lacking in transactions; Law substitutes for trust where trustworthiness fails against endgame incentives; Mere incentive compatibility is insufficient for trust as encapsulated interest (+3 more)

Broader Connections

• Trustworthiness enforced only by contract threats is not genuine trust #corroborates (0.80)
• Law substitutes for trust where trustworthiness fails against endgame incentives #expands (0.78)
• Protection substitutes for trust when trust is lacking in transactions #expands (0.72)
• Mere incentive compatibility is insufficient for trust as encapsulated interest #expands (0.72)
• Mutual trust in iterated exchange is selffulfilling through aligned incentives #corroborates (0.70)
• Guardians’ reliability can decay over time, defeating static trust guarantees #expands (0.70) — Shapiro, Susan P., The Social Control of Impersonal Trust, 126