Implicit cognition theory yields predictions untestable by available measurement tools.
Evidence
The present account supposes that individual differences in manifestations of implicit cognitive effects should be predicted by individual differences in the strength of theorized representations that underlie those effects. Measurement of those individual differences is beyond the means of present assessment technology; consequently, a large subset of the empirical implications of the present analysis are currently untestable. — Anthony G. Greenwald and Mahzarin R. Banaji, Implicit Social Cognition, 47
Categorization
- QUESTION: This acknowledges that implicit-cognition effects weren’t yet measurable in 1995 — worth chasing what changed with the IAT later that year and whether modern tools finally test these individual-difference predictions.
- XREF: connects to: Implicit cognition cannot be studied with introspection-presuming direct measures. — Anthony G. Greenwald and Mahzarin R. Banaji, Implicit Social Cognition: Attitudes,…, 22; Implicit bias surfaces strongest under time pressure but is consciously overridden with adequate time; The implicit self-esteem hypothesis requires an indirect measure that did not yet exist. — Anthony G. Greenwald and Mahzarin R. Banaji, Implicit Social Cognition: Attitudes,…, 173